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I. INTRODUCTION
There are at least 228,000 homeless people living in temporary
shelters or on America's streets according to the United States Census
Bureau,1 but a more accurate figure is probably closer to 500,000.2
Many are mentally ill, drug dependent or have a history of criminality.3
According to researchers Alice S. Baum and Donald W. Burnes, most
homeless people live personal lives "entrapped by alcohol and drug
addictions, mental illness, lack of education and skills, and self-esteem
so low it [is] often manifested as self-hate." 4
One public perception is that the homeless are responsible for an
increase in crime and a decrease in the quality of urban life.s As he
navigated the campaign trail, then New York City mayoral candidate
Rudolph Giuliani heard these words from a frustrated citizen:
I have lived only a few blocks from here for 23 years and I was asked for
money three times by bums on the way here tonight. Sometimes they have
guns. When is this going to stop? I am not interested in other people's
neighbourhoods (sic), I'm interested in mine. What are you going to do
for me and for my children?"6
1. The United States Census Bureau reports that of the 249.6 million people living in the
United States in 1991, 178,828 lived in emergency shelters and 49,793 others lived on the street.
The homeless census count was derived from a one-night enumeration conducted on March 20,
1991. One-night Census Count Totals 228,621 Homeless, UPI, Apr. 12, 1991; see also, At a Glance,
THE NAT'L J., Apr. 20, 1991, at 944 (census bureau officials admit their count was incomplete);
The Homeless Count, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept., 1991, at 13 (census bureau estimates Seattle's
homeless population at 2,539).
2. A 1987 study by the Urban Institute indicated the homeless population was between
500,000 and 600,00. MARTHA R. BuRT AND BARBARA E. COHEN, AimRscA's HOMELESS 1-2
(1989). In 1992, Martha Burt estimated the homeless population at "roughly" 15 to 25 homeless
persons for every 10,000 people in the country. MArHA R. BURT, OVER THE EDGE: THE
GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE 1980's 4 (1992). Based on the 1990 census, Burt's estimate
would put the homeless population at between 374,400 and 624,000. Other estimates place the
number of homeless as high as two to three million, or about one-percent of the population, a
figure comparable to the estimated percentage of homeless in January, 1933. Martha Burt claims
the higher estimates are exaggerated. Id. at 3-4.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 46-52.
4. ALIcE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BumREs, A NATION IN DENIAL: THE TRUTH ABOUT
HOMELESSNESS 2 (1993).
5. See Jim Doyle & John King, Matrix Program Passes Test in Federal Court, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 16, 1994, at Al ("The mayor insists that Matrix [a program designed to control the conduct
of homeless people on the street] was created in response to a torrent of citizens' complaints about
'street crime .... ); see also Sylvia W. Nogaki, Downtown at Crossroads, SEATTLE TnAEs, May 8,
1994, at Al.
6. Peter Pringle, Rudy Guiliano [sic] of Mayor, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 20, 1993, at 21
(quoting a New York City resident speaking to mayoral candidate Rudy Giuliani at a campaign
forum).
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Politicians have responded to the public outcry with promises to
enact ordinances aimed at the homeless.7 One homeless advocate calls
the official responses "knee-jerk reactions to political pressure."'"
Nonetheless, in the 1992 mayoral races in Los Angeles9 and New
York, 10 the winner was the candidate with the toughest position on
crime. 11
Elected politicians have made good on their promises to enact
ordinances aimed at the homeless. In a sixteen-city study conducted in
1993, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty found
that the number of local government ordinances aimed at controlling
homeless people had "sharply increased" in the previous two years.12
For example, seven Southern California municipalities have passed new
ordinances since 1991 that prohibit the homeless from sleeping or
camping on public property. 3 In San Francisco, a mayor who was fall-
ing behind in popular support instituted a comprehensive program to
address public nuisance crimes-the Matrix Quality of Life program.1 4
So strong was the perceived support for the program that the Board of
Supervisors was sufficiently emboldened to briefly consider a proposal
to have the police seize stolen shopping carts from the homeless.S
7. See William Schneider, Crime Pays for the Politicians; How the Politics of Fear Devoured the
Incumbents, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at C1 (noting that crime is the anti-
incumbent's issue of choice).
8. Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness is the Foe, Not the Homeless, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec.
16, 1993, at B7.
9. Republican Wins L.A. Mayor Election, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 1993, at 4.
10. Election Results: Full Reports, State by State, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 4, 1993, at 4A.
11. Schneider, supra note 7, at Cl.
12. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, THE RIGHT TO REMAIN
NOWHERE 5 (1993) [hereinafter NOWHERE].
13. Id. at 6.
14. The program was instituted in August, 1993. It redirects police resources to the
enforcement of San Francisco's ordinances prohibiting camping in public places and sleeping in
the parks between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. April Lynch, Jordan Extends Crackdown on Homeless for
Second Month, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 1993, at Al.
A federal district court denied a preliminary injunction, sought by homeless advocates, to
halt those aspects of the Matrix program that proscribed sleeping, camping, or lodging in public
parks, and the obstruction of public sidewalks. Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F.
Supp. 843, 851-53 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The court held that the homeless plaintiffs failed to establish
a sufficient probability of success on the merits of their claim to warrant injunctive relief. Id. at
864. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment for punishing"status," equal protection, right to travel, due process, and for unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 853-64.
15. Debra J. Saunders, Matrix A La Cart, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1993, at A24. The
proposal was not adopted after Mayor Jordan changed his mind on the shopping cart seizure
proposal. Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, S.F. Matrix Plan Lurches, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 1993,
at A17.
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In Seattle, Washington, the challenger to Mayor Norman Rice,
David Stern, focused his entire campaign on street crime.16 He lost the
election.17 However, just one month prior to that election, the Seattle
City Council adopted, and Mayor Rice signed into law, two ordinances
for the express purpose of better controlling sidewalk disorder.18
One ordinance forbids a person to sit or lie down upon public
sidewalks in certain designated business districts between 7:00 a.m. and
9:00 p.m. 9 Violation of the sidewalk ordinance is a civil infraction,
punishable by a maximum fifty dollar fine.20
The other ordinance prohibits aggressive begging- begging with
an intent to intimidate another person into giving money or goods.2'
Violation of the aggressive begging ordinance is punishable as a
misdemeanor.22
The facial validity of both Seattle ordinances was unsuccessfully
challenged in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on grounds
of overbreadth, due process, and equal protection. In Roulette v. City
of Seattle,23 Judge Barbara J. Rothstein upheld both ordinances as
valid exercises of governmental police power and as minor intrusions
on individual liberty.24
This Note will focus on the sidewalk ordinance for two reasons.
First, the ordinance is a unique method to control conduct in a public
forum. While its holding is consistent in outcome with City of Seattle
v. Webster, 2s a decision that upheld an intent-based pedestrian interfer-
ence ordinance, Roulette may be contrasted with a number of decisions
denying enforcement of loitering ordinances on grounds that they pun-
ished a person's status.26
16. See Dick Lilly, Rice, Stern Tell Tale of Two Cities - Stern Says 'Scary,' Mayor Sees the
Contrary, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at B1.
17. Election Results: Full Reports, State by State, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 4, 1993, at 4A.
18. See Letter from Mark H. Sidran, Seattle City Attorney, to the Honorable George
Benson, President, Seattle City Council (Aug. 2, 1993) (on file with Seattle University Law
Review).
19. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE §§ 15.48.040-.050 (1993) [hereinafter sidewalk ordinance].
See infra note 173 for full text of ordinance.
20. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 15.48.050 (1993).
21. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 12A.12.015 (1993) (hereinafter aggressive begging
ordinance]. A proscription on aggressive begging is one section of Seattle's Pedestrian
Interference Ordinance.
22. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE. § 12.A.12.015(D).
23. 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-35354 (9th Cir. 1994).
The appellants, homeless people and their advocates, did not appeal the aggressive begging
ordinance. Only the sidewalk ordinance will be at issue at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Brief of Appellants at 1, Roulette (No. 94-35354).
24. Id. at 1454.
25. 115 Wash. 2d 635, 642, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1990), cert denied, 500 U.S. 908 (1991).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25.
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The second reason to focus on the sidewalk ordinance is because
the ordinance has a disproportionate impact on the homeless-a class
of people who, by definition, make their homes in public places. While
the author of the sidewalk ordinance notes that his proposal is not "an
attack on the homeless,"27 it certainly affects the homeless more than it
does those who maintain private dwellings. As Sylvia A. Law points
out in her article entitled Economic Justice, 2 "[private property] is val-
uable precisely because it protects the individual's ability to march to a
different drummer, without having to account to the collective will."29
Thus, the sidewalk ordinance could be viewed as an unfair burden on
those who, out of necessity, must relax on the public byways.3
This Note analyzes the Roulette holding with respect to prior deci-
sions on begging and vagrancy. In addition, this Note discusses the
sidewalk ordinance with respect to the efforts of other communities to
control the detrimental effects of a growing homeless population. This
Note concludes that the Roulette holding strikes a constitutionally valid
doctrinal and jurisprudential middle ground between abandoning the
streets to the homeless and driving them from the community. It is
argued that the sidewalk ordinance is normatively valid, in that it sets a
reasonable standard of conduct that meets commonly accepted norms
of civility, serving to benefit the homeless as well as the larger
community.
Part II of this Note sets out the background for the Roulette hold-
ing through an examination of the case law and the underlying policy
considerations regarding vagrancy and begging. Section A explores the
politics of poverty. Section B briefly traces the evolution of case law on
vagrancy and loitering. Section C presents the still unsettled state of
the law regarding the right of homeless people to beg in public fora.
Part III examines the Roulette decision in some detail. Section A
presents and explains the sidewalk ordinance at issue in the case. Sec-
tion B sketches a picture of the actual people who are represented under
the more generic terms of "plaintiff" and "defendant." Finally, Section
C sets out the issues and holdings in the case.
27. Mark Sidran, Address to Downtown Seattle Rotary Club 3 (Aug. 4, 1993) (copy on file
with Seattle University Law Review).
28. Sylvia A. Law, Economic Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 134 (Norman Dorsen
ed., 1984).
29. Id. at 155.
30. See Jeremy Waldron, Essay, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv.
295, 302 (1991). In his essay, Professor Waldron points out the link between actual freedom and
spatial freedom. He argues that actual freedom is illusory absent the physical space in which to
exercise free will. According to this view, the homeless are denied freedom because they lack the
private space in which they may do as they please, free from government intrusion.
1994]
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Part IV analyzes the outcome of the Roulette holding, its reason-
ing, and policy rationale, in light of prior case law and current thinking
on the problems of homelessness. Part IV focuses on the governmental
interests that are said to justify the sidewalk ordinance: the prevention
of sidewalk obstructions and the prevention of urban blight. In this
Section, it is suggested that the Roulette court may have erred in
accepting the City's argument that the sidewalk ordinance is justified
on grounds of preventing sidewalk obstructions. The Note argues a
better rationale is the prevention of urban blight. Indeed, it is argued
that preventing urban blight is a substantial governmental interest that
justifies infringing even protected First Amendment activity-an issue
not reached in the holding.3' Urban experts justify minor intrusions on
personal liberty on the grounds that uncontrolled behavior leads to
physical decay, creating a perception of unsafe streets. The perception
of insecurity can destroy a neighborhood.
Moreover, the Roulette holding is distinguishable from the recent
federal and state court decisions that have invalidated laws aimed at the
homeless. Unlike other ordinances classified by political activists as
anti-homeless, Seattle's sidewalk ordinance reflects an intention to con-
trol rather than expel the homeless population. Part IV considers the
appropriateness of burdening homeless people with a coercive ordi-
nance-an ordinance that further complicates the already desperate
lives of people who live on the street. While most people rightfully
worry that laws that have a disproportionate effect on homeless persons
are normatively suspect, the sidewalk ordinance constitutes a minor
intrusion on the homeless while substantially benefiting the larger
community. Unless the majority community is permitted to regulate
disorderly behavior in public places, it will turn its back on the home-
less, exacerbating their problems by denial of assistance and encourage-
ment of repressive police practices. A majoritarian backlash may
already be underway in other cities.32
Part V summarizes the likely implications of the Roulette decision.
Part V suggests that the decision supports the notion that municipali-
ties are free to regulate how homeless people may utilize public spaces
on the mere assertion of a legitimate governmental purpose. Further-
more, protecting safety and aesthetics remains a substantial govern-
mental interest that justifies intrusions on otherwise harmless sidewalk
31. Although Judge Rothstein concluded that preventing "pedestrian hazards" and
"promoting the economic health" of commercial districts are "substantial" governmental interests,
Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1448, she did not reach the reasonable time, place, manner question
because she found no protected activity at issue. Id. at 1448-49.
32. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Homeless Seeing Less Apathy, More Anger, N.Y. TmEss, Feb. 25,
1994 at Al; NOWHERE, supra note 12.
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activity. However, laws that are facially valid against the homeless may
be found unconstitutional in their application if their enforcement
leaves the homeless person with no lawful place to rest.
The poor have always been with us, and so has the majoritarian
desire to punish and control the dislocated.33 An analysis of the new
ordinance proscribing sidewalk sitting must begin with an overview of
homelessness and the historical development of laws proscribing gen-
eral vagrancy and begging.
II. BACKGROUND
If the enactment of homeless laws seems to create public dissen-
tion, that may be because the public is in conflict on how it ought to
treat its homeless population.34 Part II of this Article briefly explores
this societal dilemma as it is reflected in the politics of poverty and in
the case law on vagrancy and begging.
A. The Politics of Poverty
The politics of poverty is about squaring America's historical
compassion for the underdog with its worship of the work ethic. This
Section explores the underlying policy considerations that courts con-
front in determining whether laws that intrude on the liberty of the
displaced poor are fair assertions of governmental power.
1. Are the Homeless "Deserving" or "Undeserving" Poor People?
America's view of poverty is framed by two related and deep-
seated values: a strong work ethic and a suspicious attitude toward
poor people.3" A Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance, struck
33. Official attempts to punish and control the displaced poor have been documented as far
back as the seventh century. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and
Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 631, 635 n.26 (1992); see generally Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public
Places: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REv. 285 (1993) (this recently
published article provides an excellent history of how a number of countries have attempted to
control begging).
34. A 1993 Harris poll reflected the public's conflicting emotions of compassion and
coercion toward the homeless. The fact that 81% said they would be willing to pay higher taxes if
the money was directed at helping the homeless shows the public's compassionate side. By
comparison, 90% were willing to pay higher taxes to fight crime. However, the details of the poll
reveal the public's coercive side. Where 50% said they were "very willing" to pay higher taxes to
fight crime, only 28% were "very willing" to help the homeless. Mark N. Vamos, The Lowdown on
High Taxes, Bus. WK., Nov. 1, 1993, at 35. The poll surveyed 1,252 adults October 14-18, 1993,
and the results are accurate to within three percentage points. Id.
For further discussion of the dispute in this country over treatment of the homeless, see
generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR (1989).
35. See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 20 (1992).
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down by the United States Supreme Court in 1972, illustrates the
point:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, com-
mon gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays,
common drunkards, common night walkers . . . persons wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful
business... persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings
of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon
conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for
Class D offenses. 36
Early in the nineteenth century, public officials attempted to
divide the poor into two classes, the deserving and the undeserving.
This distinction remains alive today.3 7 The deserving poor are the
aged, widows, heads of family who lose a job, and the infirmed. The
undeserving poor, the paupers, are the able-bodied who refuse to
work.3" Under the vagrancy principle, the community cares for its
poor and drives out its paupers.39
Throughout most of our history, Americans have considered the
homeless part of the undeserving pauper class by virtue of their tran-
sience, their economic dependence, and often their addiction to alcohol
and drugs.4" But beginning in the early 1980's, political advocates have
attempted to portray the homeless as among the deserving poor.41 To
do this, the homelessness problem was redefined as one of poverty and
victimization,4 2 growing out of flawed governmental policies and
adverse macroeconomics. 3 As a result of this effort by political advo-
cates, Urban Studies Professor Michael B. Katz finds that a "moral
36. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156-157 n.1 (1972).
37. MICHAEL E. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 5 (1989).
38. Id. at 191-92.
39. See BAUM & BURNFS, supra note 4, at 107.
40. Id.; see also, KATz, supra note 37, at 191 ("[U]nemployed men asking for relief were the
quintessential undeserving poor, immediately suspect for their inability to support themselves in
the land of opportunity.").
41. BAUM & BuRNEs, supra note 4, at 108.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 91. Specific policy changes that have had an effect on homelessness include
decriminilization of public drunkenness, resulting in a shift of inebriates from the jail to the street;
a decrease in the number of public hospital treatment beds for alcohol and drug treatment; loss of
low-income housing where inebriates could hide and imbibe; and the deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill without a corresponding increase in community-based mental health centers. See id.
at 156-66. For an excellent discussion of the effects of mental illness and chemical dependency on
the homeless population and corresponding affects or changes in governmental policy, see BuRT,
infra note 46, at 107-126.
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ambiguity" now hovers over the homeless. 44 Some people now con-
sider today's homeless to constitute a "new deserving poor" despite the
fact that today's homeless probably work less than their nineteenth
century counterparts.45
While the increasing numbers of homeless correlate to the baby-
boom population bulge,46 the most comprehensive homelessness stud-
ies 47 support the view that today's street denizens are not merely a
microcosm of the general population who, because of bad luck, are
temporarily without shelter. Instead, the majority of homeless are in
serious need of medical and behavioral treatment. More than half the
homeless population has been institutionalized in a mental hospital, a
chemical dependency in-patient program, or a state or federal prison.4
If county and municipal jails are considered, the figure rises to two-
thirds of the homeless population.49 Half the homeless people studied
rated high enough on the scale of depression to warrant immediate
treatment.50 Furthermore, the forty-three percent that have been hos-
pitalized for mental or chemical dependency problems have been, on
average, out of work for four to five years."1 That compares to a mean
of thirty-eight months out of work for those who have not been
institutionalized. 5 2
2. How Much Help Do the Homeless Deserve?
The American understanding of the social compact is that people
are inherently responsible to provide for their own welfare. S3 At the
framing of the United States Constitution, it was the general view that
44. KATz, supra note 37, at 192.
45. Id. But see BAUM & BURNES, supra note 4, at 108 (In the 1990's, "Compassion fatigue"
has caused many people to reclassify the homeless as "undeserving." The public is "becoming
less generous and more careful about its support [of the homeless and] city officials are using a
variety of laws to prevent their cities from becoming 'havens' for homeless people.").
46. BAUM & BURNES, supra note 4, at 30-33, 156-57. In 1990, there were 108 million people
between the ages of 18 and 44, the age group most at risk for the onset of mental illness and most
likely to be seriously involved with alcohol, drugs, and the criminal justice system. This is 48%
more people than fell in that age bracket in 1970. Id. Indeed, the numbers of alcoholic and
mentally ill people are consistent with their historic distribution in the population. MARTHA R.
BURT, OVER THE EDGE: THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE 1980's 107 (1992). These
data suggest that the homelessness problem may be relieved as the baby-boomers age.
47. For a comprehensive statistical study of homelessness in America, see generally BURT,
supra note 46.
48. Id. at 24.
49. Id.
50. BURT & COHEN, supra note 2, at 3-4.
51. See BURT, supra note 46, at 25.
52. Id.
53. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 153-54 (1990).
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the poor had no inherent right to be free from want. 4 Since then, the
social compact has expanded, at least to the extent that it is considered
the purpose of government to provide for minimum necessities at pov-
erty levels for those who cannot help themselves.s
In his book, The Age of Rights, Louis Henkin points out that car-
ing for the needy was traditionally viewed as a moral obligation satis-
fied principally through the church.S6 Henkin believes that the United
States has become a "welfare state,"5s7 where the polity now accepts the
notion that the social compact includes responsibility for the general
welfare that exceeds the "sum of the particular rights narrowly con-
ceived."15 8  In other words, public purpose and retained rights are
informed by the moral assumptions of the social compact. On this
view, the homeless are not entitled to welfare, but the legislature should
still extract wealth from the majority and transfer it to the needy out of
moral, if not constitutional, obligation. s9
Because welfare is provided by the grace of the legislature, and not
out of inherent right, it is provided grudgingly and selectively. The
traditional view holds that the primary responsibility for a person's
welfare, happiness, and financial security lies with the individual.6 °
Societal responsibility is seen as secondary and supplementary to what
the individual can do for himself or herself.61 According to this view,
societal support will be minimal, and adjusted in accordance with some
general notion of an individual's effort toward self-help and compliance
with social norms.62
For example, New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani
recently announced a new plan to deny shelter to homeless families
who refuse to participate in treatment or training programs. 63 In addi-
tion, homeless single adults would be required to pay rent for shelter
space unless they participate in similar programs.64
According to this view, the homeless are not relieved of personal
responsibility to account to the collective will. As Harvard Law Pro-
54. Id. at 99, 101.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id. at 160.
57. Id. at 153.
58. Id. at 102.
59. Cf. id. at 153.
60. See id. at 160.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 160-61.
63. Celia W. Dugger, Plan Ties Shelter for the Homeless to Social Services, N.Y. TIMEs, May
7, 1994, at Al.
64. Id.
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fessor Mary Ann Glendon points out in her book, Rights Talk,6" every-
one shares an obligation to the commonweal. To apply Glendon's
argument, a homeless person is not "a captain of fate in a sea of unlim-
ited liberty."66 The homeless owe something more to the community
than merely avoiding the "active infliction of harm." 6 7
Perhaps it is this expectation of shared obligation to the welfare of
the community that also causes many Americans to look on the home-
less with some measure of contempt when they see evidence of disre-
spect and disorder.
Having briefly examined the policy considerations that underlie
governmental promulgation and judicial scrutiny of laws affecting the
homeless, a discussion of the case law on vagrancy and loitering is now
in order.
B. Vagrancy and Loitering Laws
Historically, vagrancy laws were designed to coerce paupers back
into the workplace in order to maintain an adequate labor force and to
prevent crime.68 For example, until the Massachusetts Supreme Court
struck down the state's vagrancy statute in 1967, it was a crime to be
poor and found wandering the streets.69 The statute had criminalized
idleness, which it defined as failure to give a satisfactory account.7 °
Such harsh laws were an extension of the community's moral voice that
demanded individual productivity from all members of the society,
except those who were considered the deserving poor.71
Beginning in the 1950's, courts began striking down vagrancy laws
as unconstitutionally criminalizing status.72 For example, Washington
struck down its vagrancy statute in 1967. 7s But, communities have not
given away control over their streets and parks. General vagrancy pro-
scriptions have evolved into more targeted loitering laws that homeless
65. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991).
66. See id. at 44-45.
67. See id. at 77.
68. FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 3, 22, 40-41
(1971); see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 n.4 (1972) (noting that
economics and crime prevention have historically driven the promulgation of loitering laws).
69. Alegata v. Commonweath, 231 N.E.2d 201, 206-07 (Mass. 1967) (striking down the
statute on grounds of unreasonable use of police power).
70. Id. at 206.
71. See KATZ, supra note 37, at 12-14.
72. E.g., Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 91 N.E.2d 666, 666-67 (Mass. 1950) ("Prima facie,
mere sauntering or loitering on a public way is lawful and the right of any man, woman or child.");
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164-65 (holding that there is a constitutional right to walk, stroll, or
wander aimlessly). But see City of Cleveland v. Gogola, 113 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953)
(upholding ordinance that criminalized "common" begging).
73. City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967).
19941
Seattle University Law Review
advocates call "sophisticated, deliberate and institutionalized [efforts
to] persecut[e] an already terribly destitute and marginalized group of
people."74
The evolution of vagrancy and loitering laws falls into three "gen-
erations": s first, general vagrancy laws that criminalize mere status;
second, laws that proscribe loitering with intent to solicit prostitution;
and, third, laws that criminalize loitering with an intent to commit a
variety of illegal acts, most particularly selling drugs or intimidating
passersby.76
1. General Vagrancy Laws
General vagrancy laws are usually attacked on two grounds: void-
for-vagueness and overbreadth." A vagueness challenge attacks the
clarity of a law and whether it serves as a vehicle for arbitrary enforce-
ment by police."8 In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,79 the United
States Supreme Court invalidated on vagueness grounds a Jacksonville,
Florida vagrancy ordinance that criminalized, inter alia, habitual loaf-
ing." Justice William Douglas, writing for a unanimous court, said the
Jacksonville ordinance was void for vagueness because it failed to pro-
vide "a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden," and because it encouraged "arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions. 8 1
Similarly, in Kolender v. Lawson, 2 the Court struck down a Cali-
fornia vagrancy statute that penalized wandering "upon the streets or
from place to place without apparent reason or business" and failing to
provide police with satisfactory identification. 3 The Court found the
statute unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define what consti-
tuted "credible and reliable" identification. 4
74. NowHERE, supra note 12, at 5.
75. See generally William Trosch, Comment, The Third Generation of Loitering Laws Goes to
Court: Do Laws that Criminalize 'Loitering with the Intent to Sell Drugs' Pass Constitutional
Muster?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 513 (1993).
76. Id. at 518.
77. Tracy A. Bateman, Jr., Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Similar
Activity by Poor or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R.5th 455, 463 (1992).
78. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.").
79. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 162.
82. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
83. Id. at 354.
84. Id. at 358. Of the two prongs of the vagueness test, the most important is defining
standards for arrest. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S.
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The overbreadth doctrine applies in two circumstances. First,
overbreadth may apply where a government regulation infringes pro-
tected speech and, second, where the regulation reaches other constitu-
tionally protected conduct."5 The latter form of overbreadth is really a
substantive due process claim.
Where expressive conduct and not pure speech is at stake, the
United States Supreme Court will uphold an ordinance unless the over-
breadth is "real" and "substantial." 6 However, as the Court acknowl-
edged in Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 7 substantial
overbreadth "is not readily reduced to an exact definition."88  It does
appear, though, that symbolic conduct is within the outer perimeter of
speech that the Court considers worthy of protection under the over-
breadth doctrine. For example, in Board of Airport Commissioners of
Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 9 the Court voided a regulation that
prohibited First Amendment activities in an airport terminal on
grounds that it unconstitutionally encompassed the wearing of, inter
alia, "symbolic clothing." 90 But, where the speech is merely incidental
to the regulated conduct, the Court is unwilling to preclude govern-
mental action on First Amendment grounds.91
Consequently, where the government can show harm to the com-
munity, homeless advocates have had no success in challenging loiter-
87 (1965). In Shuttlesurth, the Court ruled on a Birmingham, Alabama ordinance that
criminalized any failure to heed a police order to move on. The Court found the ordinance
constitutionally repugnant where a person was not acting unlawfully because, "[Il]iterally read....
this ordinance says that a person may stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the whim of any
police officer." Id. at 90. But, where the ordinance is narrowly construed to apply only where the
person is obstructing the sidewalk, the Shuttlesu th Court found the "move on" order could be a
facially valid exercise of police authority. Id. at 91.
85. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
86. Id.; accord City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987); City of Seattle v. Ivan, 71
Wash. App. 145, 150, 856 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1993).
87. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
88. Id. at 800.
89. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
90. Id. at 575. The Court has protected many forms of symbolic speech. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (obscene
garment); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(black armbands as protest against the Vietnam War); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-
11 (1974) (carrying a flag upside down demonstrates that "an intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea."); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 ("The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.").
91. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("It is possible to f'ind some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes ... but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.").
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ing ordinances on First Amendment grounds, except when they attack
bans on begging. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,92
homeless advocates had constructed a symbolic encampment across the
street from the White House to protest insufficient concern for the
plight of homeless people. In upholding the National Park Service's
ban on unauthorized camping, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that while sleeping and camping may involve some symbolic
expression, it was insufficient to overcome the Park Service's valid
interest in protecting the park.93
Similarly, in Stone v. Agnos,94 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that "sleeping would seem to be the antithesis of speaking." '
Without reaching whether sleeping could be protected as expression,
the Agnos court found that the City of San Francisco could validly
remove homeless people from a park even where the homeless person
was intending to "dramatize" his plight.96
Homeless advocates have had more success in challenging
vagrancy ordinances where the proscribed conduct is not shown to be
harmful to the community. In striking down an ordinance proscribing
habitual loafing, the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou gave
constitutional protection to aimlessly wandering the public streets. 9 7
The Court said the government cannot "broadly and absolutely" deny
access to streets, sidewalks and parks.9 8 Similarly, the Washington
Supreme Court has given standing still in a public place equal constitu-
tional validity to moving about. 99
Whether a proscription on particular conduct passes the substan-
tive due process test turns on the perceived harmfulness of the conduct
or whether the governmental motive is proper or improper. Lack of
harmful consequence was the linchpin of the Washington Supreme
92. 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); cf. University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson,
649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986) (holding that shanties erected in protest to apartheid constitute
symbolic speech).
93. Id. at 294.
94. 960 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1992).
95. Id. at 895.
96. Id.
97. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171; see also Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968) ("[Sltreets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places
are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for
the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.");
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 612 n.1 (1971) (ordinance proscribing the mere
gathering of three or more people in an alleyway is invalid on grounds of overbreadth and
vagueness); Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 1987) (walking in the street is
not a crime).
98. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
99. City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 408, 423 P.2d 522, 524 (1967).
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Court decision in Seattle v. Pullman,100 overturning a curfew ordi-
nance. The ordinance prohibited minors from loitering, wandering or
playing during proscribed hours. The court concluded the ordinance
was overbroad because it made "no distinction between conduct calcu-
lated to harm and that which is essentially innocent." 10 1
Similarly, a Florida appellate court found the following ordinance
vague and overbroad: "No person shall sleep upon or in any street,
park, wharf or other public place."10' The court found that the ordi-
nance punished "unoffending behavior" and gave insufficient warning
that the conduct was forbidden by statute.10 3 The court apparently
found that no health or safety purpose was served by the ordinance.
Another Florida appellate court drew a distinction between sleep-
ing and camping, finding one activity harmful and the other not. In
City of Pompano v. Capalbo,'04 the court invalidated on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds an ordinance that made it unlawful to "lodge or
sleep in" a vehicle on a street or other public property. The court held
the sleeping proscription was unconstitutionally vague because it, inter
alia, would punish a "tired child asleep in his car-seat."10' Further-
more, the court held that absent a health, safety or aesthetic rationale,
the sleeping proscription would punish conduct that "cannot be con-
ceivably criminal in purpose. "106 However, the court acknowledged
that if the ordinance had been limited to just "lodging," it probably
would have survived a constitutional challenge on grounds that public
lodging could be harmful.10 7
Thus, sleeping and camping ordinances usually survive over-
breadth challenges when the government can show the ordinances are
enacted for a health, safety, or aesthetic purpose. For example, in See-
ley v. State of Arizona,l08 an appellate court upheld an ordinance that
100. 82 Wash. 2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973).
101. Id. at 799, 514 P.2d at 1063 (1973).
102. State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180, 180-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 281 So.
2d 504 (Fla. 1973).
103. Id. at 131; see also State v. Father Richard, 836 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1992). In Father
Richard, the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a Las Vegas ordinance that punished and defined
vagrancy as wandering upon private property without "visible or lawful business with the owner
or occupant." Id. at 623. The court held the ordinance void-for-vagueness on grounds that "an
individual must necessarily guess as to when an innocent stroll becomes a criminal 'loitering.'"
Id. at 624.
104. 455 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985).
105. Id. at 470.
106. Id. at 470-71.
107. Id. at 469; accord Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1987). The
Hershey court held that a proscription on sleeping in a car was void-for-vagueness and
unconstitutionally overbroad, but "lodging" in car was a valid proscription.
108. 655 P.2d 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
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prohibited lying, sleeping, or sitting in any public right of way at any
time.1"9 The court found that sleeping and lying on the public side-
walk were not protected rights and that proscribing sidewalk sitting
was rationally related to preventing pedestrian and traffic
obstruction.11°
Similarly, in Whiting v. Town of Westerly,"' the First Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a ban on beach and car sleeping in a resort
community, writing "[t]he act of sleeping in a public place, absent
expressive content, is not constitutionally-protected conduct."'1 2 The
ordinance at issue in Whiting was only enforced during the summer
tourist season, was limited to sleeping during the nighttime hours, and
was obviously aimed at preventing tourists from camping out on public
property after they failed to find lodging in the community." 3
Homeless advocates have had their greatest success where they
have shown an improper governmental purpose. In three cases often
cited in support of constitutional challenges to loitering ordinances, the
courts found the impermissible governmental purpose was to drive the
homeless from the community.
In Parr v. Municipal Court for Monterey-Carmel Judicial Dis-
trict, 1 4 the California Supreme Court held a loitering ordinance invalid
on grounds that it was aimed at "hippies" even though it facially
applied to everyone. 15 The Carmel City Council had taken official
notice of the "extraordinary influx of undesirable and unsanitary visi-
tors to the City" and passed a "Declaration of Urgency" to ban people
from sitting on public sidewalks or steps, or lying or sitting on any
public lawns." 6
Similarly, in Tobe v. City of Santa Ana,' 7 a California appellate
court invalidated an ordinance that proscribed camping in streets,
parks, and parking lots."' The court took notice of the fact that several
years earlier the city had entered into a stipulation ending a "war on the
109. Id. at 805.
110. Id. at 807; see also Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994) ("[N]o person has a constitutional right to erect or maintain a
structure on the public way.").
111. 942 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 21; accord City of Portland v. Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Or. Ct. App. 1982),
review denied, 660 P.2d 681 (Or. 1983); People v. Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 738 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986); Ferrell v. City of Santa Monica, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 705 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1972).
113. See Whiting, 842 F.2d at 20.
114. 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
115. Id. at 158.
116. Id. at 354.
117. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App.), review denied, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18 (1994).
118. Id. at 395.
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homeless"" 19-a war that included mass arrests for trivial offenses and
the use of harassment techniques such as frequently turning the park
sprinklers on at night. 120 Thus, even though the anti-camping ordi-
nance was established for the "purpose of . . . maintain[ing] public
streets and areas . . . in a clean and accessible condition," the court
overturned the ordinance with the following explanation:
The camping ordinance is a butcher knife where a scalpel is required. It
is a transparent manifestation of Santa Ana's policy, adopted five years
ago, to expel the homeless. The city may preclude the erection of struc-
tures in public places and it might ban "camping" in select locations with
a properly drafted ordinance, but it may not preclude people who have no
place to go from simply living in Santa Ana. And that is what this
ordinance is about.121
Finally, in Pottinger v. City of Miami, 122 a federal district court
enjoined Miami officials from enforcing the city's various ordinances
prohibiting sleeping in public, obstructing sidewalks, and using parks
at night. 123 The court found that the ordinances were overboard as
applied to homeless people "to the extent that they result in class mem-
bers being arrested for harmless, inoffensive conduct that they are
forced to perform in public places"-conduct such as eating and sleep-
ing. 124 In the court's view, because Miami had created a legal milieu
where the homeless had "no place where they [could] lawfully be," the
ordinances interfered with a right to be free of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and a right to free movement. 125
Pottinger draws a clear distinction between the facial validity of
vagrancy ordinances and their validity as applied to an identifiable
group of individuals. The case law appears to support the notion that
vagrancy ordinances that do not merely criminalize status, those that
are designed with a public safety or aesthetic purpose, may be found
facially valid. However, as Pottinger, Tobe, and Parr indicate, facially
valid ordinances may be held unconstitutional where the real purpose is
illegitimate as evidenced by the ordinances' enforcement.
119. Id. at 389.
120. Id. at 388.
121. Id. at 395.
122. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
123. Id. at 1584.
124. Id. at 1577. However, the Pottinger court concluded that there is no facial right of
privacy in this regard. I& at 1575 ("[T]he law does not yet recognize an individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy in such activities as sleeping and eating.").
125. Id.; cf. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 858 (holding that homelessness is a "condition" and not a"status," and thus not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment).
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As will be shown in the next section, lawmakers have responded to
the concern over an illegitimate purpose by writing ordinances that
associate the vagrancy with an intent to engage in an otherwise illegal
activity.
2. Loitering With Intent
The second and third generation of loitering laws were aimed at
deterring certain illegal conduct by criminalizing otherwise innocent
activity where the actor demonstrated an intent to engage in an unlaw-
ful act. 126 In this way, lawmakers hoped to overcome the twin concerns
of overbreadth and vagueness. These "intent-type" ordinances associ-
ate the otherwise innocent loitering with an illegal activity, require a
showing of specific intent, and sometimes list circumstances from
which police officers and jurors can infer intention.
For example, the second generation of loitering laws was aimed at
deterring prostitution."' Seattle's prostitution loitering law, upheld in
Seattle v. Slack, 128 requires that the perpetrator intentionally solicit
another to commit prostitution: "A person is guilty of prostitution loi-
tering if he or she remains in a public place and intentionally solicits,
induces, entices, or procures another to commit prostitution." 129 Thus,
the right to loiter on a street corner is not disturbed unless the loitering
is for the purpose of soliciting prostitution.
The third generation of loitering laws-laws that focus on crimes
other than prostitution-have not found universal acceptance in the
courts. Although the Washington Supreme Court has upheld intent-
type drug and pedestrian interference ordinances, other courts have
found similar ordinances constitutionally flawed. In City of Tacoma v.
Luvene, 130 the Washington Supreme Court upheld a Tacoma, Wash-
ington drug loitering ordinance that proscribed conduct "manifesting
the purpose to engage in drug-related activity.' 13' The court inter-
preted the phrase "manifesting the purpose" as an intent element, and
explained that the purpose of requiring an intent element is to limit the
universe of prohibited conduct and thereby limit the "reach into the
126. Trosch, supra note 75, at 518.
127. For a comprehensive discussion of prostitution loitering laws, see generally Jack L.
Littwin, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes or Ordinances Proscribing Solicitation for
Purposes of Prostitution, Lewdness, or Assignation-Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.3D 519 (1977).
128. 113 Wash. 2d 850, 784 P.2d 494 (1989).
129. Id. at 854, 784 P.2d at 496. Contra, e.g., Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 233-34 n.2
(Fla. 1993); Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
130. 118 Wash. 2d 826, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).
131. Id. at 836, 827 P.2d at 1379. "The use of the word 'manifesting' in the ordinance
indicates that some overt conduct performed while loitering is necessary to determine if a person
has the intent to engage in illegal drug-related activity." Id. at 843, 827 P.2d at 1383.
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arena of constitutionally protected First Amendment conduct."' 32 But,
Luvene holds that intent must be inferred from acts that are in them-
selves consistent with the underlying illegal activity and are clearly
articulable.'33
However, even carefully framed drug and prostitution loitering
laws have failed on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.' 34 For
example, in City of Akron v. Rowland,13- the Ohio Supreme Court
struck down an Akron drug loitering law similar to that of Tacoma,
Washington. 136  The Rowland court refused to find an intent element
in the words "circumstances manifesting the purpose"' 137 and found
that, even if there was an intent element, the law was overbroad
because it encompassed such "innocent" acts as "furtive" trans-
fers138 -acts that the Washington court found consistent with drug
dealing. 139
The Washington Supreme Court has upheld another intent-type
ordinance that bears more directly on the subject of this Note. In 1990,
the Washington Supreme Court upheld a pedestrian interference ordi-
nance that proscribes intentionally obstructing a pedestrian or vehicular
traffic 4° by walking, standing, sitting, lying, or placing an object in
such a manner as to block passage by another person or vehicle or
requiring another person to take "evasive action to avoid physical con-
tact.' 41 In City of Seattle v. Webster,' 42 the majority held that the
132. Id. at 844, 827 P.2d at 1384.
133. Id. at 843-44, 827 P.2d at 1383; see also Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1453-54. Judge
Rothstein struck all circumstances of intent to intimidate from the aggressive begging ordinance
on grounds that the listed circumstances, such as directing profane language at the person
solicited, impermissibly "describe[d] speech which is clearly protected by the First Amendment."
Id. at 54. Cf. Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)
(invalidating a prostitution loitering ordinance on grounds that it inferred intent from the arresting
officer's knowledge that the suspect had been convicted of prostitution in the past). But see Lisa
A. Kainec, Comment, Curbing Gang Related Violence in America: Do Gang Members Have A
Constitutional Right to Loiter on Our Streets?, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 651 (1993) (arguing that
being a known gang member should be a circumstance consistent with drug dealing).
134. See Wyche v. Florida, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993) (prostitution loitering); Holliday v.
City of Tampa, 619 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1993) (drug loitering); City of Akron v. Rowland, 618
N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1993) (drug loitering); Houston v. City of Oklahoma City, 856 P.2d 574 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993) (prostitution loitering).
135. 618 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1993).
136. Id. at 145.
137. Id. at 144.
138. Id. at 149; see also A.C.L.U. v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Va.
1990) (passing small objects such as business cards). But see Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 237
(Fla. 1993) (arbitrary enforcement found to have resulted from an insufficient list of
circumstances).
139. Luvene, 118 Wash. 2d at 844, 827 P.2d at 1384.
140. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 12A.12.015(B)(1) (1993).
141. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 12A.12.015(A)(4) (1993).
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intent element "saved" the ordinance from unconstitutional over-
breadth.143 Thus, as indicated by Webster, intent-type ordinances can
be effective at avoiding overbreadth and vagueness challenges.
In order to round out a background discussion on vagrancy ordi-
nances, it is important to touch on the case law related to begging.
While Seattle's sidewalk ordinance does not proscribe begging per se, it
does affect the beggar's ability to solicit on downtown sidewalks by
requiring him or her to remain standing.
C. Laws Regulating Begging
The First Amendment plays an active role in determining the lim-
its government may place on begging in public fora.11 As a general
rule, soliciting money for charitable purposes receives at least an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny by the courts (requiring the government to
show a substantial interest in the activity)1 4 and, in some cases strict
scrutiny, a level of protection equal to that given pure, non-commercial
speech. 146
In Schneider v. State,147 the United States Supreme Court applied
intermediate scrutiny by overturning an ordinance that prohibited
door-to-door solicitation. 14' The Court held that a substantial govern-
mental interest in protecting the community from fraudulent solicita-
142. 115 Wash. 2d 635, 802 P.2d 1333 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908 (1991).
143. Id. at 642, 802 P.2d at 1338; see also People v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara (Caswell),
758 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1988). In Caswell, the California Supreme Court upheld a state statute
proscribing loitering near a public toilet with intent to engage in "lewd or lascivious" conduct.
The court found that lewdness was of sufficient clarity to provide adequate notice of the
proscribed conduct and that, because the lewdness was proscribed near a designated area, it
provided sufficient guidance to police. Castell, 758 P.2d at 1057; cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (holding that an ordinance that proscribed loitering after
being told to "move on" by a police officer lacked sufficient guidelines to inform police and citizen
of what constituted the proscribed activity).
144. See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or
Similar Activity by Poor or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R.5TH 455 (1992).
145. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing,
63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 297 (1992).
146. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (ruling
that charitable solicitation is not commercial speech because it "does more than inform private
economic decisions"); see also Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965-67 (1984)
(holding that a state may not distinguish between charities by percentage of solicitation costs).
Even though charitable fundraising is protected as pure speech, the Court's holdings in the area of
commercial speech supports the conclusion that an ordinance aimed at the conduct of fundraising
will be treated by the courts as a regulation aimed at the underlying speech itself. See Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
147. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
148. Id. at 165.
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tion provides insufficient grounds to restrain "one who wishes to
present his views on political, social or economic questions. '"149
Strict scrutiny was applied in Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 1" where the Court clearly articulated the
nexus between the economic activity of fundraising and protected
speech. The Court held that charitable solicitation merits "exacting
first amendment scrutiny" because speech is intertwined with the con-
duct of raising money."s Therefore, said the Court, regulations that
result in limiting the character of the charitable appeal, even when
based on a "paternalistic premise," unfairly burden the speaker's
rights.1 5 2
In certain circumstances, charitable solicitation and panhandling
may be distinguishable activities for First Amendment purposes. In
Arizona ex rel. Williams v. City Court of Tucson, -3 the court distin-
guished between charitable solicitation, generally, and begging, specifi-
cally, assigning the latter to the realm of impermissible loitering. 5 4
However, the Williams court never reached the First Amendment
implications of the begging ban. Rather, the court's decision turned
solely on whether the proscription on loitering with intent to beg was
unconstitutionally vague. 5
149. Id. at 163; see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (holding that a law
requiring religious organizations to register with the state if more than half their funds were raised
from nonmembers violated the establishment clause of the Constitution); Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at
636 (invalidating an ordinance that limited door-to-door solicitation to those organizations that
used at least 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes).
150. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
151. Id. at 788-89.
152. Id. at 790-91, 794 (noting that, although solicitation is subject to regulation,
government has no greater authority to regulate the fundraising activity than it does to regulate
the speech that accompanies the appeal); see also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943)
(holding that a state could not "prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly
religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of [religious] books ... or
because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious
purposes"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (holding that government can not
restrain itinerant evangelists who spread religious doctrine as well as solicit funds). But see
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that an ordinance could ban purely
commercial handbills from the streets that implicate only the solicitor's interest in pursuing "a
gainful occupation in the streets").
153. 520 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
154. Id. at 1170.
155. Id. at 1170-71; Cf. C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In
C.C.B., an ordinance that proscribed "solicit[ing] alms in the streets or public places of the city"
was overturned on overbreadth grounds because the government is "not entitled to absolutely
prohibit a beggar's exercise of his freedom of speech." Id. at 50. However, the court held the city
could impose a "narrowly drawn permit system." Id.; see also People v. Fogelson, 145 Cal. Rptr.
542 (1978) (overturning a Los Angeles ordinance that required a permit to solicit on public
property on grounds that it gave unlimited discretion to licensing officials).
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A California appellate court, in Ulmer v. Municipal Court,1 5 6
upheld a state law that strictly limits begging to a passive activity. 15 7
The statute proscribes "accosting" a person in public for the purpose of
begging or soliciting alms, a method of solicitation that the court found
did not merit constitutional protection. s8 The statute distinguishes
between the person who merely sits or stands by the wayside asking for
money and one who purposely walks up to a person and seeks a hand-
out."59 In Blair v. Shanahan,160 a federal district court in California
declined to follow Ulmer on grounds that the statute prevents mere
annoyance.1 6 ' However, the Blair court acknowledged that if "accost"
means "intimidation," then there is a sufficiently compelling state
interest to overcome the burden imposed on a constitutionally pro-
tected activity such as begging. 162
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Young v. New York City
Transit Authority, 163 distinguished charitable solicitation from begging
on the basis of its effect on subway passengers. The Young court held
that the New York City Transit Authority was not unreasonable in
concluding that, by disrupting and startling passengers, the beggar cre-
ated "alarmingly harmful conduct" that could result in a serious acci-
dent.16 ' This court addressed the First Amendment question only in
dictum. Judge Altimari, writing for the majority, "wonder[ed]"
whether begging was "divested of any expressive element as a result of
the special surrounding circumstances" of a crowded subway
platform. 165
But even the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would not permit
its Young subway holding to be brought to the surface as an absolute
ban on begging in a public forum. In Loper v. New York City Police
Department,166 the Second Circuit invalidated an ordinance that pro-
156. 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1976).
157. Id. at 488.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 447-48; accord People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1993).
160. 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
161. Id. at 1324.
162. Id.
163. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
164. ld. at 158; The United States Supreme Court has upheld bans on charitable solicitation
where the activity does not take place in a traditional public forum. See, e.g., International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (holding that charitable
solicitation can be proscribed in airport terminals because terminals are nonpublic fora); United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding that the post office could prohibit charitable
solicitation on the sidewalk near the entrance).
165. Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
166. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
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scribed loitering for the purpose of begging on city streets. The City
had advanced the ordinance on grounds that panhandling inevitably
leads to aggressiveness and "the ruination of a neighborhood. ' 167 The
Loper court distinguished the city streets from the limited public forum
of a subway terminal, finding that the City had failed to offer a compel-
ling state interest in "excluding those who beg in a peaceful manner
from communicating [their financial needs to] their fellow citizens." 168
The dissenting judge in Williams summed up in a cogent hypo-
thetical the difficulty of distinguishing legitimate charitable solicitation
from what others might perceive to be an illegitimate and therefore
unprotected act of panhandling.
For example, imagine the following situation at the corner of Congress
and Stone in downtoum Tucson: (1) a group of Salvation Army workers
soliciting contributions; (2) a blind man playing his accordion with a tin
cup available for contributions; and (3) a group of "hippie-type" indi-
viduals engaged in like conduct. No one would dispute that they are all
doing exactly the same thing, namely, remaining in a public place for the
manifest purpose of begging."'
In summary, some view the homeless as undeserving of special
treatment because they have no one but themselves to blame for their
plight. Others, however, view the homeless as victims of governmental
and economic mistakes who are, thus, deserving of social and legal
compassion.
Faced with the legal, and often political, inability to simply ban
vagrants from town, governments have developed sophisticated ordi-
nances that attempt to control a growing homeless population. A sur-
vey of the case law reveals that courts have given broad deference to
lawmakers where ordinances are narrowly tailored to deter harmful
conduct, avoid infringing protected speech, and are not designed to
167. Id. at 701.
168. Id. at 705; see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (holding that streets and
sidewalks are traditional venues for expressive activity and, thus, government must offer a
compelling societal interest in limiting speech); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to
Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. Rv. 896, 910 (1991) (noting
that "begging is speech that attempts to engage the listener in the beggar's poverty and difference"
and is particularly worthy of First Amendment protection).
169. Williams, 520 P.2d at 1172 (Krucker, J. dissenting). Chief Justice William Rehnquist
may not concur that charitable solicitation and panhandling are indistinguishable in a public
forum. Writing in dissent in Schaumburg, then Justice Rehnquist argued that there is "nothing in
the United States Constitution [that] should prevent residents of a community from making the
collective judgment that certain worthy charities may solicit door to door while at the same time
insulating themselves against panhandlers, profiteers, and peddlers." Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at
644 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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merely harass the homeless. 171 As will be shown later in this Note, the
Roulette decision falls into this category of deferential holdings. 171
While it may be comforting to learn that a community has the
right to maintain its health, safety, and aesthetic standards against the
dispossessed who wander the streets and parks, the reasonableness of
the laws offer little solace to the homeless themselves. It must be
remembered that the homeless have no private space where they can
avoid the majority's coercive presence, even if that presence is altruistic
and facially constitutional. This fact of life has caused other courts to
overturn a variety of ordinances as applied to homeless people.
In Roulette v. City of Seattle, lawmakers did not attempt to ban
begging per se. However, as will be shown in the next part of this
Note, the Roulette court had to determine if speech was infringed by an
ordinance that possibly affects the ability of homeless people to solicit
money or others to conduct First Amendment activities such as regis-
tering voters.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: ROULETTE V. CITY OF SEATTLE
Roulette v. City of Seattle came on cross motions for summary
judgment before Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington. On March 10,
1994, Judge Rothstein held for the defendant, the City of Seattle, find-
ing the City's sidewalk ordinance constitutionally valid on its face.172
In the following sections, the Roulette holding on the sidewalk
ordinance is discussed in some detail. After setting out the ordinance
at issue in Section A, the parties are illuminated in Section B because,
after all, the ordinance affects real human beings who have a vital stake
in the outcome of the litigation. This Part then concludes with an
explication of the issues and holdings in the Roulette decision.
A. The Ordinance
The sidewalk ordinance 173 provides a civil infraction for sitting or
lying down upon the public sidewalks in the downtown and neighbor-
hood commercial zones between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. The ordi-
170. See supra notes 85-125 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
172. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1454.
173. The sidewalk ordinance, No. 116885, was enacted by the Seattle City Council on
October 4, 1993 and signed by the Mayor on October 7, 1993. The ordinance was codified at
SEATTLE, WASH., CODE §§ 15.48.040-.050. Section 15.48.050 provides that a violation of the
sidewalk ordinance is a civil infraction, punishable by a $50 fine. Failure to sign the citation or
appear in court constitutes a misdemeanor regardless of the disposition of the notice of civil
infraction.
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nance contains a warn-before-citing provision, in which the offender is
not to be cited unless he or she continues in violation after having been
notified by a police officer.174 The ordinance also provides exceptions
for disabled people and those using the sidewalk under a valid
permit. 17s
B. The Parties
The Roulette plaintiffs were a diverse group of people who used
the public streets for business, social, and political activities, as well as
for life sustaining activities such as sleeping.1 76 The lead plaintiff,
Megan S. Roulette, is described as a homeless person who "left home
due to abuse."
At night, Ms. Roulette sleeps in parks or alleys. She dislikes shelters
because there are insufficient beds and she finds the atmosphere dis-
empowering. If Ms. Roulette is not allowed to sit or to lie down on the
Sitting or lying down on public sidewalks in downtown and neighborhood commercial
zones.
A. Prohibition. No person, after having been notified by a law enforcement officer
that he or she is in violation of the prohibition in this section, shall sit or lie down upon a
public sidewalk, or upon a blanket, chair, stool, or any other object placed upon a public
sidewalk, during .the hours between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. in the following zones:
1. The Downtown Zone, defined as the area bounded by the Puget Sound
waterfront on the west, South Jackson Street on the south ....
2. Neighborhood Zones, defined as areas zoned as Commercial 1 (Cl),
Commercial 2 (C2), Neighborhood Commercial 1 (NCI) ....
B. Exceptions. The prohibition in Subsection A shall not apply to any person:
1. sitting or lying down on a public sidewalk due to a medical emergency;
2. who, as the result of a disability, utilizes a wheelchair or similar device to
move about the public sidewalk;
3. operating or patronizing a commercial establishment conducted on the public
sidewalk pursuant to a street use permit; or a person participating in or attending a
parade, festival, performance, rally, demonstration, meeting, or similar event conducted
on the public sidewalk pursuant to a street use or other applicable permit;
4. sitting on a chair or bench located on the public sidewalk which is supplied by
a public agency or by the abutting private property owner;
5. sitting on a public sidewalk within a bus stop zone while waiting for public or
private transportation .... SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 15.48.040 (1993).
174. Id. § 15.48.040(A). Subsequent to the Roulette decision, the city of Seattle amended
the sidewalk ordinance to clarify the warn-before-citing provision. SEATTLE, WASH.,
ORDINANCE 117103 (1994). Section 15.48.050(A) was amended to delete the notification
reference and the following provision was incorporated as new Section C: "No person shall be
cited under this section unless the person engages in conduct prohibited by the section after
having been notified by a law enforcement officer that the conduct violates this section."
SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 15.48.050(C) (1994).
175. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 15.48.040(B) (1993).
176. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-10,
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (No. C93-1554R) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memo].
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sidewalks ... she believes she will starve and will go to jail. She does
not know a safe way to hitchhike out of town.1"
Plaintiffs Brian Wojcik and Jules E. Richard use the sidewalks to
solicit alms. 7 ' Leslie Soderberg, who is in frail health, uses the side-
walks to access various public services. "She walks with a cane and
must often sit down to relieve her exhaustion. Many times she cannot
find a bench to use, and so she sits down on the sidewalk."' 79 Among
the other plaintiffs were a registrar of voters who sits at a table on the
sidewalk; members of political parties and activist organizations who
use the sidewalks for protests and to seek political donations; and a
street musician who sits at a piano.180
The defendants were the city of Seattle, its mayor, and its police
chief.' In its argument to the court, the city identified a number of
citizens who were concerned about the safety of the sidewalks and the
community's economic vitality."8 2 For instance, 82-year-old Myrtle
Cottman was identified as a person who has difficulty "navigating...
around people sitting or lying on the sidewalks." ' 3 Carol McCarthy
was quoted as being fearful of aggressive panhandling. 8 4 And, Cathy
Wickwire was quoted as being tired of having to call the police in order
to have an inebriated person removed from her office doorway.18 1
Betty Spieth, the executive director of a business association, was
quoted as being concerned about the loss of retail business:
Walking down the Ave [sic] can feel like running a gauntlet. Pedestri-
ans have to dodge aggressive panhandling, lewd and derogatory com-
ments, and the residue of urine, alcohol, and worse. They also have to
step over people sitting individually or in groups on our sidewalks. Eve-
ryday I hear from people who just simply choose not to come to the dis-
trict anymore. The result of this activity has been a noticeable
deterioration in our business district. 1 8 6
177. Id. at 3-4.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id. at 5-6.
180. Id. at 7-10.
181. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1442.
182. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Support of Defendants' Motion at 14-19, Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442
(W.D. Wash. 1993) (No. C93-1554R) [hereinafter Defendants' Memo.].
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id. at 14-15.
185. Id. at 16.
186. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 18:147
Roulette v. City of Seattle
C. Issues and Holdings
The sidewalk ordinance was unsuccessfully challenged on five
grounds: void-for-vagueness, violation of substantive due process,
infringement of a right to travel, infringement of First Amendment
rights, and violation of equal protection.
1. Void-for-Vagueness
The warn-before-citing provision was the focus of the plaintiffs'
vagueness attack on the sidewalk ordinance. At issue was whether the
legal right to tell a person to "move on" before issuing a citation pro-
vided police with the type of "unfettered discretion" that was found
constitutionally objectionable in Papachristou and Shuttlesworth.18 7
The court distinguished these cases by pointing out that the Seattle
ordinance clearly defined the conduct to be avoided: specifically, that
the prohibited conduct is sitting on the sidewalk during the proscribed
hours. "Since the police cannot cite an individual until he or she has
been warned about the ordinance, the notification requirement operates
to restrict police discretion rather than increasing police discretion to
define the prohibited conduct. 1 88
The court also rejected the plaintiffs criticism that the ordinance
lacks specificity as to how much time may elapse between warnings and
whether the warnings are "space specific." "Certainly the ordinance
does not address every conceivable question concerning the applicabil-
ity and enforcement of the ordinance which could arise. But if this
were the standard, few laws, if any, would pass constitutional
muster." 189
2. Substantive Due Process
The plaintiffs' substantive due process claim revolved around the
issue of whether sidewalk sitting relates to any legitimate municipal
interest. The city advanced the notion that it had a legitimate interest
in pedestrian safety and economic vitality.1 90 The plaintiffs countered
that "merely sitting on a sidewalk in this city, when that activity does
not interfere with pedestrian traffic, is ... innocent activity." 191
Judge Rothstein rejected the plaintiffs' substantive due process
argument that the sidewalk ordinance punished inoffensive conduct.
The court found that "ensuring pedestrian safety and safeguarding the
187. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 176, at 12; see also supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
188. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1446.
189. Id. at 1447.
190. Defendants' Memo, supra note 182, at 13-21.
191. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 176, at 16.
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economic vitality of commercial areas" were legitimate governmental
interests.19 The court also concluded that the sidewalk ordinance was
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 9 3 The court's
conclusions were based upon three findings. First, the court found it
made "common sense" to discriminate between people sitting on the
sidewalk and those standing outside a business establishment because"nobody has been complaining about people standing or squatting. ' 194
Second, the fact that the ordinance is under-inclusive of all hazards that
might impair pedestrian travel does not make the ordinance irra-
tional. 95 Third, providing exceptions for "sidewalk cafes" and other
sidewalk uses does not preclude a rational basis for the ordinance.196
3. Right to Travel' 97
The Roulette plaintiffs attempted to analogize the sidewalk ordi-
nance to the denial of travel rights found in Pottinger v. City of
Miami. 1' First, the plaintiffs claimed the ordinance interfered with the
ability of homeless people to travel through the city, and to rest when
and where necessary.' 99 Second, the ordinances were designed to
impermissibly expel and had the effect of expelling the homeless from
the city by burdening their freedom of movement.20 0
192. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1447.
193. Id. at 1450.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Judge Rothstein accepted the City's argument that "abutting property owners can't
use any other location while "sidewalk sitter[s] ... can just as well sit elsewhere." Id.
197. The right to travel is a claim brought under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where the Court invalidated a one-year residency requirement
for receiving welfare on grounds that the statute inhibited interstate travel. In Shapiro, the Court
held that the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right for which abridgment requires a
compelling governmental interest. Id. at 630. In another right to travel holding, Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Court invalidated a one-year waiting
period for free non-emergency medical care, holding that what was important was not so much the
deterrent effect on travel to the state, but rather the irrational penalty the waiting period imposed
on newcomers. Id. at 258.
198. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). Citing Memorial Hospital, the federal district court
in Pottinger found that a number of Miami, Florida, ordinances combined to deny the homeless
the fundamental right to travel. "[Tihe City's enforcement of laws that prevent homeless
individuals who have no place to go from sleeping, lying down, eating and performing other
harmless life sustaining activities burdens their right to travel." Id. at 1580. See also Tobe v. City
of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an anti-camping ordinance
violated the homeless' right to travel); Paul Ades, The Constitutionality of "Antihomeless" Law:
Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77
CAL. L. REv. 595, 609 (1989). For a discussion of the Pottinger and Tobe cases, see supra text
accompanying notes 117-25.
199. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 176, at 17-18.
200. Id.
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Judge Rothstein disagreed. She did not find that the ordinances
intruded on the right to travel, and she distinguished the instant case
from Pottinger and Tobe on two grounds. First, unlike the cities in the
analogous cases, there is no evidence that Seattle was motivated by a
desire to expel the homeless from the community. Second, because
Seattle allows the homeless to sleep on its streets at night, there is no
evidence that the homeless are impermissibly impeded in traveling
through the commercial areas of the city.20 1
4. First Amendment Rights
The focus of plaintiffs' First Amendment violation claim was
whether the sitting or lying on a sidewalk involved any constitutionally
protected expression.20 2 Judge Rothstein quickly disposed of the claim,
concluding that sidewalk lounging, in and of itself, does not contain an
expressive element. Thus, in the court's view, the sidewalk ordinance
only regulates "pure physical conduct. 20 3
The plaintiffs made two arguments in support of sitting as expres-
sion. First, "the silent presence of an unkempt and disheveled person
sitting or lying on a sidewalk, holding out his or her hand or cup to
receive a donation, is expressive conduct . . . ." Second, the sidewalk
ordinance was overbroad because it would interfere with pure speech
activities such as musical performances, registering people to vote, and
collecting political initiative petition signatures.20 4
The court acknowledged that a "kernel of expression" could be
found in almost any human activity, 20 5 but that sitting was not "inex-
tricably intertwined with, or essential to, the protected expression"
cited by the plaintiffs.20 6 For example, begging and petitioning could
be conducted from a standing position. 0 7 However, the court did
invite an "as applied" challenge to the ordinance from the piano-play-
ing, street musician plaintiff should he later find that his expressive
activities become substantially abridged.208
Because the court did not find any facial infringement of the First
Amendment, it did not reach the question of whether the sidewalk
201. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1447-48.
202. Id. at 1448.
203. Id. 1448-49.
204. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 176, at 24-25.
205. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1449 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25
(1989)).
206. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1449.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 1449 n.8; see also id. at 1446 ("If police officers enforce the otherwise clear
directives of the sidewalk ordinance in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, then plaintiffs
would certainly be justified in bringing a suit challenging the application of the ordinance.").
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ordinance was content neutral or a reasonable time, place, manner
restraint.
5. Equal Protection Rights
Finally, Judge Rothstein concluded that the sidewalk ordinance
did not offend equal protection guarantees.20 9 Citing to City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,21 the Roulette court set out the two
grounds under which it would give strict scrutiny to the sidewalk ordi-
nance: first, if the ordinance discriminated on the basis of a suspect
classification or, second, if it infringed on a constitutionally protected
personal right.211 Judge Rothstein found neither ground applicable
because the plaintiffs had failed to convince the court that there were
due process, free speech, or right to travel infringements, or that there
is precedent for establishing homelessness as a suspect classification.212
Relying on Parr v. Municipal Court,213 the case where a California
seaside community tried blatantly to eject "hippies" from town, the
plaintiffs argued that Seattle's sidewalk ordinance was inspired by simi-
lar, improper motives in violation of the equal protection clause:
"[T]he defendants have publicly stated that the purpose of the side-
walk ordinance .. .was to improve the appearance of city streets by
prohibiting unsightly persons from sitting or lying on sidewalks. 214
Judge Rothstein distinguished between ordinances that are
targeted at individuals engaging in disorderly conduct and ordinances
that target homeless people "in a hostile and discriminatory fash-
ion. "215 Citing to the Washington Supreme Court decision in Webster,
the case upholding Seattle's Pedestrian Interference Ordinance, Judge
Rothstein held that the sidewalk ordinance does not violate equal pro-
tection guarantees "by disparately affecting the homeless as a class." 216
209. Id. at 1449-50. Usually a plaintiff who fails to prevail on First Amendment grounds
can do no better under the Equal Protection Clause. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 55 n.4 (1986).
210. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
211. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1450.
212. Id. Indeed, United States Supreme Court precedent argues against suspect
classification for the homeless. The Court has refused to grant such status to three populations
that compose a would-be "homeless class." Specifically, suspect class definition was denied on
the basis of poverty, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23
(1972), age, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976), and mental
retardation, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
213. 479 P.2d 353 (Cal.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
214. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 176, at 22.
215. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1450.
216. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Part IV contains an analysis of the court's holding in Roulette.
While the analysis concludes that the outcome was correct, it suggests
that one rationale for the holding is better than another. But regardless
of the legal rationale, the principal conclusion of the analysis is that a
city should feel no shame in passing an ordinance that requires any
person, homeless or not, to maintain a reasonable standard of civility in
public fora.
Section A of Part IV examines the principle rationale for the side-
walk ordinance: that it is designed to prevent sidewalk obstructions.
The analysis concludes that the obstruction rationale, standing alone,
may be an unreasonable exercise of the police power, especially in light
of Seattle's existing intent-based pedestrian interference ordinance.
Section B maintains that the urban blight rationale is actually a
better one, because preventing urban blight is a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose and keeping business sidewalks clear is rationally related to
that end. Furthermore, had the court reached the question, the Seattle
ordinances could have withstood heightened scrutiny on the basis of
preventing urban blight.
Section C sets out a policy rationale that justifies an ordinance that
is likely to have a disproportionate impact on the homeless. The analy-
sis distinguishes the circumstances of the Roulette case from the cir-
cumstances underpinning the holdings in Pottinger, Tobe, and San
Francisco's action under their "Matrix" program. In Seattle, the city is
attempting to find a way to live with its homeless population. In the
other cities, officials are or have been attempting to export their home-
less population through unreasonably enforced, mean-spirited anti-
camping and sleeping ordinances. Seattle should feel no guilt in enact-
ing what appears to be aspirational ordinances that, in the end, set a
reasonable standard of behavior and forestall the unreasonable enforce-
ment of other valid nuisance ordinances.
A. The Obstruction Rationale
Judge Rothstein based her rational basis review of the sidewalk
ordinance principally on the city's interest in preventing sidewalk
obstructions.217 If preventing sidewalk obstructions had been the sole
reason for the ordinance, one could argue that the court had failed to
appreciate the irrationality of the means-ends fit. Although Judge
Rothstein held the ordinance to be rationally related to both preventing
obstructions and "safeguarding the economic vitality of commercial
217. Id.
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areas, "218 the obstruction purpose appears underinclusive, perhaps
unjustified, and probably unneeded in light of the city's existing pedes-
trian interference ordinance.21 9
In citing the case of 82-year-old Myrtle Cottman, the woman who
has trouble "navigating" through the sidewalk loungers, the City
sought to establish the sidewalk obstruction problem posed by street
denizens. While the problem may at times be real, the question is
whether it is so substantial as to warrant infringing the ability of a tired
child to sit upon the sidewalk while waiting in line with its mother for a
movie-an act that "cannot be conceivably criminal in purpose. "220
If the city is to burden those who wish to rest on the sidewalk, but
pose no threat to passersby, then it ought to demonstrate that the side-
walk ordinance will effectively clear a path for the aged and disabled.
One can argue that the ordinance fails to measure up in this regard
because its' sweep is substantially underinclusive, leaving in place
many sidewalk impediments. For instance, the ordinance itself
excludes an array of permitted sidewalk impediments, from espresso
carts to wheelchair-bound citizens. 22 '  The plaintiffs conjure the
unjustly discriminatory image of the homeless person nestled up
against the side railing of a sidewalk cafe that juts into the public right-
of-way. Under the ordinance, a table sitter impeding sidewalk travel is
legal but the sidewalk lounger is not.222 The city's response to this
discrimination, a rationale apparently accepted by the court, is some-
what suspect in the context of obstructions: "[Abutting property own-
ers] contribute to public safety by maintaining the vitality of the urban
area. ' 23 Would not "vitality" bring to the sidewalk yet more people
who pose yet more impediments?
While the underinclusive argument may appear persuasive under
these circumstances, the argument usually fails to convince a court, as
it failed to do in the instant case. 224 The underinclusive argument fails
218. Id. at 1447.
219. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 12A.12.015 (1993).
220. Cf. City of Pompano v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468, 470-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
review denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985) (holding an anti-sleeping
ordinance unconstitutional because, inter alia, it would infringe upon a sleeping child); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182 (1983) (holding that activities that might justify a ban on
content neutral expression include obstructing sidewalks; blocking access to buildings; and
threatening injury to persons or property).
221. SEArLE, WASH., CODE § 15.48.040(B) (1993). The permitted exceptions are listed in
the ordinance at supra note 173.
222. See Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 176, at 21.
223. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1450.
224. Id. ("[T]he City does not need to address all hazards of a similar nature in order to
have a rational basis for passing legislation addressing a particular part of the perceived
problem.").
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because the United States Supreme Court has made clear that an ordi-
nance will survive rational basis review even though it resolves only
part of the problem."'
A better approach may lie in attacking the justification for the
ordinance, where common sense indicates not all sidewalk loungers
pose a threat to passersby. As a rule, an ordinance proscribing consti-
tutionally protected activity should target and eliminate "no more than
the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy. 2 2 6 In Roulette, the
"evil" is the obstructed sidewalk. For example, in Boos v. Barry,22' the
United States Supreme Court limited the construction of a statute mak-
ing it unlawful "to congregate within 500 feet of any embassy" on
grounds of protecting the security of the buildings.228 The Court lim-
ited enforcement to circumstances where police reasonably think secur-
ity is threatened. 229 According to this view, the sidewalk ordinance
should be limited to those circumstances where police reasonably
believe a sidewalk lounger will obstruct someone. Surely a lounging
homeless person would not pose an obstruction in many circumstances.
Moreover, courts have required that an ordinance take into
account the physical circumstances such as sidewalk width.230  For
example, in Davenport v. Alexandria,231 the court remanded for factual
findings a case involving an ordinance that proscribed musical per-
formances on the sidewalk.23 The court remanded because the com-
225. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (Brennan, J. dissenting)
("This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive classifications on the sound theory that a
legislature may deal with one part of a problem without addressing all of it.").
226. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988); see also Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968) (noting that courts are especially
protective of public places "historically associated with the exercise of the First Amendment
rights").
227. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
228. Id. at 329.
229. Id. at 330.
230. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). In Grayned, the Court
struck down an ordinance that banned picketing near schools because it failed to take into account
the particular physical circumstances. However, the Court upheld a companion ordinance that
limited the making of loud noise near the school, even though the noise ordinance had an
incidental impact on expression. See also Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that an ordinance limiting the number of picketers must take account of time, place, and
circumstances); Hickory Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Hickory, 656 F.2d 917, 923-24 (4th Cir.
1981) ("In order to uphold the ordinance [regulating picketing], we must find that its
requirements concerning the number and spacing of demonstrators, and sign and stave size have
been carefully tailored to the locality."); cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). In
upholding a ban on solicitation on Postal Service sidewalks, the Court in Kokinda found that
solicitation is "disruptive of business" because it "impedes the normal flow of traffic." Id. at 733-
34.
231. 710 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1983).
232. Id. at 152-53.
Seattle University Law Review
plaint failed to take into account such factors as the number of
musicians, sidewalk width, and whether the performances actually
blocked access to buildings.233
On this view, the Roulette court should have been more skeptical
of the ordinance's sweep, considering that the ordinance does not con-
sider whether the sidewalk lounger is actually posing a threat to pass-
ersby.23 4 And, it applies to sidewalks without regard to their width.
Judge Rothstein may not have been as concerned as these other
courts about the precise nature of the threat posed by sidewalk loungers
because she did not find that the sidewalk ordinance substantially bur-
dened expressive activity.235 While acknowledging that the ordinance
could have some effect on people conducting First Amendment activi-
ties, such as beggars, voter registrars, political groups, and musicians,
Judge Rothstein found that sitting was "not essential to the communi-
cation of their message. "236
The obstruction rationale is weakened most, however, by the fact
that the city has already adopted an ordinance that targets "the exact
source of evil" :237 the sidewalk lounger that intentionally obstructs
passersby. A person is in violation of the city's pedestrian interference
ordinance2 8 when "he or she intentionally... obstructs pedestrian or
vehicular traffic. ' 2' 9 Thus, the police have at their disposal a legal
means to cite people who do, in fact, pose a threat to sidewalk safety.
This intent-based pedestrian interference ordinance was upheld by
the Washington Supreme Court in City of Seattle v. Webster.240 More-
over, one can deduce from that holding that the non-intent-based
sidewalk ordinance, upheld in Roulette, might have failed to pass con-
stitutional muster had it been heard by the Washington Supreme
Court. That court, in Webster, upheld the pedestrian interference ordi-
nance only on the grounds that it did not proscribe innocent acts:241
The ordinance does not prohibit innocent intentional acts which
merely consequentially block traffic or cause others to take evasive
233. Id. at 151.
234. The ordinance does, however, protect the innocent sidewalk lounger to the extent that a
violation does not occur unless the violator fails to heed a police warning. SEATTLE, WASH.,
CODE § 15.48.040(C) (1994).
235. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1449; cf. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 41 (1986) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) ("[The] presumption of statutory validity . . . has less force when a classification
turns on the subject matter of expression.").
236. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1449.
237. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.
238. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 12A.12.015 (1993).
239. Id. § 12A.12.01S(b)(1).
240. 115 Wash. 2d 635, 647, 802 P.2d 1333, 1341 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908 (1991).
241. Id. at 642, 802 P.2d at 1338.
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action. Many of those consequential results may arise from protected
activities such as collecting signatures on a petition. In addition, mere
sauntering or loitering on a public way is lawful and the right of any
man, woman, or child. Under [Seattle's pedestrian interference ordi-
nance], it is not unlawful to exercise that right even though it may cause
another person or driver to take evasive action. The City of Seattle
argues that inclusion in the ordinance of the element of specific intent
saves it from being unconstitutionally overbroad. We agree.2 42
If resting upon the public sidewalk is conduct akin to the"walk[ing] or loafling]" protected in Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville,243 Seattle's sidewalk ordinance may be unconstitutionally over-
broad because it reaches the sidewalk lounger who is not actually
obstructing-not engaging in conduct calculated to harm;244 not inten-
tionally causing people to "take evasive action. ' 245  If, on the other
hand, sidewalk sitting receives less protection than walking or loitering,
one must still question whether the ordinance is rationally related to
preventing obstructions where it appears underinclusive, fails to con-
sider physical circumstances, such as sidewalk width, and where police
already have at their disposal an intent-based obstruction ordinance.
A more realistic and justifiable rationale for the sidewalk ordi-
nance may be that sidewalk loungers in the downtown and commercial
zones pose a threat to economic vitality, aesthetic values, and a general
242. Id. at 641-42, 802 P.2d. at 1338 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In his
concurrence and dissent, Justice Robert Utter said that even with its intent element, the pedestrian
interference ordinance "should be upheld, but its application limited to substantial obstruction of
traffic." Id. at 653, 802 P.2d at 1344 (Utter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). There is
nothing unusual about employing an intent element to narrow the reach of an ordinance. See, e.g.,
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (gathering in a crowd with the intent to cause a public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm); United States v. Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1988)
(intent to extort through use of a threatening letter); United States v. Tabacca, 924 F.2d 906 (9th
Cir. 1990) (upholding 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j), which proscribes interference with airline personnel);
United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987) (upholding a
housing ordinance that proscribed intimidation of housing workers); City of Seattle v. Huff, 111
Wash. 2d 923, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) (holding that a statute proscribing the intent to intimidate on
the telephone using threats of physical or property harm is valid); Maciolek v. Johnson, 101 Wash.
2d 259, 676 P.2d 996 (1984) (proscribing the use of a weapon with the "intent to intimidate
another ...."); see also Cicarelli v. Key West, 321 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
("Absent criminal intent or criminal negligence 'tending to impede passage' is not a crime, and
absent a refusal to obey a lawful order to move on, no threat to public safety is apparent. Under
such circumstances the 'delicate balance' must favor the petitioner's constitutional rights including
the right of assembly."); cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (holding that
municipalities are "free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks" when the criteria for
enforcement does not "entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed").
243. 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
244. Cf. Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 799, 514 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1973) (An
ordinance is overbroad where it makes "no distinction between conduct calculated to harm and
that which is essentially innocent.").
245. Webster, 115 Wash. 2d at 642, 802 P.2d at 1338.
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feeling of physical safety. In a speech to downtown business people,
Seattle City Attorney Mark Sidran, the author of the sidewalk ordi-
nance, said that when people sit or lie on the sidewalk "day after day
• .. [they] threaten public safety in a less direct but perhaps more
serious way. ' 246
A critical factor in maintaining safe streets is keeping them vibrant
and active in order to attract people and create a sense of security and
confidence. When people are deterred from using the sidewalk and
storefronts close, a downward spiral of blight may begin.... We must do
what we can to prevent this downward spiral from setting in.247
If the author of the sidewalk ordinance is to be taken at his word,
then it seems an important governmental purpose is to protect the city
from people who lie about on urban sidewalks. In Section B, this pur-
pose's legitimacy is analyzed.
B. The Urban Blight Rationale
If preventing urban blight is an important purpose underlying the
sidewalk ordinance, then is such a purpose a legitimate governmental
interest and, if so, is the sidewalk ordinance rationally related to that
purpose? In this section, it is suggested that a community may protect
its aesthetic values by enacting proscriptions on otherwise innocent
conduct that has the secondary consequence of causing urban blight.
Moreover, it is possible that preventing urban blight would support a
favorable holding, even if a court should find that the sidewalk ordi-
nance infringed constitutionally protected conduct.
In looking at the secondary consequences, the City asserts a signif-
icant governmental interest in the economic vitality of its commercial
areas. 24" By citing the comments of Betty Spieth, the businesswoman
who worries that customers will not run the "gauntlet" of sidewalk
loungers to shop in area stores, the city expressed concern for the
effects of sidewalk disorder on those citizens who have the means to
avoid trouble-those who can choose to live or shop elsewhere. It is
the prevention of disorder-or, really the prevention of the perception
of disorder-that is the governmental interest at stake in the sidewalk
ordinance.
Whether it is fair to burden the homeless in order to avoid disor-
der is debatable, and is addressed later in this Note.249 But, whatever
246. Mark Sidran, Address to Downtown Seattle Rotary Club 2-3 (Aug. 4, 1993) (copy on
file with Seattle University Law Review).
247. Id. at 3.
248. Defendants' Memo, supra note 182, at 17.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 268-313.
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the case for reasonableness, case law supports the view that a munici-
pality is justified in addressing urban blight, even if doing so burdens
expressive activities.250
For example, the United States Supreme Court said in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, "a city's interest in attempting to preserve the
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect. 251
Furthermore, the validity of the secondary consequences of the expres-
sive activity (i.e. whether sidewalk sitting actually creates urban blight)
does not depend on scientific studies, but rather on a reasonable belief
in the cause and effect relationship based on the experiences of other
communities.25 2
If preventing urban blight is a significant governmental interest,
does preventing people from sitting on the sidewalk during the busi-
ness day address that interest? Authorities on urban sociology say it
does. Wesley G. Skogan in his book, Disorder and Decline,25 3 points
out that teenage gangs congregating on street corners, the presence of
prostitutes and panhandlers, the verbal harassment of passersby, public
drinking, gambling, and drug use creates the perception of disorder.25 4
This perception of disorder results in what Professors James Q. Wilson
and George L. Kelling describe as the "broken windows" effect.255
The broken windows effect is the notion that "if a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will
soon be broken" by people out for "fun or plunder. ' 25 6 On this view,
"[t]he unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. ' 25 7
250. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 479 (1984). In
permitting Los Angeles to prohibit signs on utility poles, the Court said that visual clutter
implicated aesthetic interests that "are both psychological and economic. The character of the
environment affects the quality of life and the value of property in both residential and
commercial areas." Id. at 816-17; cf City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2044-45 (1994)
(holding that cities may use sign ordinances to minimize visual clutter but may not "completely
foreclose a veneral means of communication that is both unique and important").
The Washington Supreme Court has held that aesthetic concerns can rise to the level of a
compelling governmental interest. See State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 59, 592 P.2d 811, 814,
appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979). But see Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wash. 2d 737, 747,
854 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1993) (holding that aesthetic interests are not sufficiently compelling to
infringe a candidate's right to political speech under the state constitution (Art. 1, § 5)).
251. 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
252. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986) (finding that"neighborhood blight" is a consequential effect of adult movie theaters without requiring the city
to prove it).
253. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 2 (1990).
254. Id.
255. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANIC, March 1982,
at 31.
256. Id. (emphasis in original).
257. Id at 34.
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As a contributor to street disorder, panhandlers or the groups of people
camped out on busy street corners (homeless or not) can initiate the
decline of an urban zone, creating an environment that attracts muggers
and robbers-people who prefer to operate where they believe law
enforcement is lax and victims are already intimidated.2"'
In the public forum, sidewalk camping often instills in passersby
the fear of distasteful, worrisome encounters.25 9 In an area prone to
panhandling, verbal harassment may be used like a weapon to gain
dominance over a victim. As Wilson and Kelling point out, "the pros-
pect of a confrontation with an obstreperous teenager or a drunken
panhandler can be as fear-inducing for defenseless persons as the pros-
pect of meeting an actual robber; indeed, to a defenseless person, the
two kinds of confrontation are often indistinguishable. 260
Wesley G. Skogan argues that disorderly conditions "signal a
breakdown of the local social order. ' 261 This "signal"-a doubt about
security-has serious consequences for a community and its citizens
because it can bring about a spiral of decline. The spiral results from
what Wilson and Kelling describe as, first, a citizen's fear of the streets,
then an avoidance of public places, and finally, flight from the commu-
nity altogether.262 As the lower court in Loper put it, "[r]eality and
everyday experience confirm this 'Broken Windows' effect."2 63
If the sidewalk ordinance partially addresses the secondary conse-
quences of otherwise constitutionally protected activity (for example,
begging or registering voters), does the ordinance discriminate on the
basis of content? It could be argued, for example, that only homeless
people-and their symbolic message of plight-are infringed by the
ordinance.264
258. Id.
259. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 255, at 31.
260. Id. at 32; But see Donald E. Baker, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts
to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MiAMI L. Rav. 417, 433-434 (1990-91) (arguing that ordinances
that infringe on the homeless can not be justified on grounds of crime prevention because,
statistically, the homeless do not commit more crimes than other people).
261. SKOGAN, supra note 253, at 2.
262. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 255, at 36; see also SKOGAN, supra note 253, at 3, 13,
47-50.
263. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-35, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that despite the validity of the "broken
windows" effect, a complete ban on begging is unreasonably restrictive).
264. However, this Author agrees with Judge Rothstein in Roulette that merely sitting on the
sidewalk, absent actual begging, is not an expressive act because it conveys none of the
characteristics that pertain to a political statement. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 302-06 (1984) (Marshall, J. dissenting). Specifically, merely sitting is not
rendered at a selected time or location; it is not a reenactment or staging of homelessness; it does
not present a satirical theme; it does not constitute a novel mode of communication; and one is not
able to distinguish "impostors" who are taking advantage of the "demonstration" to merely camp
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Even if the ban on sidewalk sitting could be construed as a
restraint on symbolic speech or peaceful begging, the ordinance retains
a content neutral character where the asserted governmental interest
(urban blight.) is unrelated to the suppression of the expression. 265
Thus, the day-to-day sidewalk activity by the homeless is not a politi-
cal message that trumps a city's substantial governmental interest in
protecting the public from the secondary consequences of the protected
activity.266 This is especially true where the message that the homeless
send by camping out on the sidewalk is not a coherent one nor is it one
capable of being readily understood by passersby. 67
Thus, preventing urban blight is a substantial governmental inter-
est that justifies the enactment of Seattle's sidewalk ordinance even
though the ordinance might infringe the liberty of homeless people to
one degree or another. While sidewalk lounging is not the sole cause of
urban blight, it can lead to the perception of civil disorder, and the
perception of disorder can begin and exacerbate a spiral of decline.
But, justifying the ordinance is only part of the analysis. Section C
takes up the question of whether the ordinance treats the homeless
unfairly when one considers that their very home is the public
walkways.
on the sidewalk. Valid political demonstrations are permitted under an exception to the sidewalk
ordinance. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 15.48.040(b)(3) (1993).
265. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. Where the regulation aims at the secondary consequences of
the constitutionally protected activity and is not applied because of a disagreement with the
message presented, the court will deem it content neutral. Where alternative channels are
available for the expression, the court will find the ordinance facially constitutional on a showing
of substantial, as opposed to compelling governmental interests. See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S.
at 47; Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 n.7 ("When the Government seeks to regulate conduct that is
ordinarily non-expressive it may do so regardless of the situs of the application of the regulation.
Thus, even against people who choose to violate Park Service regulations for expressive purposes,
the Park Service may enforce regulations relating to . . . urination .... "); see also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (noting that the government has a lesser burden where the
expression is in the form of conduct rather than the written or spoken word).
266. See American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 71 (holding that "quality of urban life must be
accorded high respect"); see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding
that where the governmental intent is not the suppression of the underlying message, government
may regulate personal conduct if the regulation has only an "incidental limitation on First
Amendment freedoms.").
267. See Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) ("[B]egging in the subway is experienced as transgressive conduct
whether devoid of or inclusive of an intent to convey a particularized message."); see also Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
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C. Distinguishing Roulette from Pottinger, Tobe and "Matrix":
Aspirational Ordinances, Reasonably Enforced
Homeless advocates tend to lump the enactment of Seattle's side-
walk ordinance with other municipal actions they consider "hostile" to
the homeless.26 Section One considers whether Seattle's ordinances
are hostile in the same way as those considered in Pottinger269 and
Tobe, 270 and those being enforced in San Francisco's Matrix Program.
Sections Two and Three conclude that Seattle's approach is differ-
ent, more aspirational, and tending to benefit the homeless as well as
the larger community. An aspirational ordinance is one that sets a
community standard that maintains common and widely held values of
civil behavior.271
1. Distinguishing Pottinger, et al.: An Effort to Live with the
Homeless
Seattle's approach is different from those in Pottinger, Tobe, and
those enforced in San Francisco's Matrix Program because there is no
evidence that the city intends to drive out its homeless population.
First, Seattle has not denied the homeless a place to lawfully sleep at
night on public property. Specifically, the downtown sidewalks may be
used for sleeping after 9:00 p.m. 272
In contrast to Seattle, Miami provided no lawful place for home-
less people to sleep at night, unless they secured private accommoda-
tionsY' 3 On this ground, the Pottinger court found the enforcement of
Miami's relevant ordinances, 271 inter alia, cruel and unusual punish-
ment when applied to homeless people.
For plaintiffs, resisting the need to eat, sleep or engage in other life-
sustaining activities is impossible. Avoiding public places when engaging
in this otherwise innocent conduct is also impossible .... As long as the
homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they can lawfully be,
the challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them
268. See NOWHERE, supra note 12, at ii-iii.
269. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla 1992).
270. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App.), review granted, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 18 (1994).
271. See MARY Am GLENDON, RIGHTs TALK 104-05 (1991).
272. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE, § 15.48.040(A) (1993).
273. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1559 n.11.
274. The court noted five relevant laws: pedestrian interference; sleeping in any public
place; park closure from 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; loitering in a manner that tends to alarm or
create an "immediate concern for safety"; and loitering with intent to obstruct pedestrians or
vehicles. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1559-60 nn.10-14.
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for something for which they may not be convicted under the eighth
amendment (sic]-sleeping, eating and other innocent conduct.2 75
In Pottinger, Judge Atkins recognized the principle that laws seem
reasonable when applied to people who own private property may be
unreasonable to those who must conduct all of their personal activities
in the public forum.2 76 Similarly, in Tobe, the anti-camping ordinance
at issue in the case made it virtually impossible for the homeless to
sleep anywhere on city property. Camping was defined as using "tar-
paulins, cots, beds, sleeping bags, [or] hammocks" and the camping
ban applied to streets, parking lots, parks, and "public area[s],
improved or unimproved."' 2 7 And, in San Francisco, the city enforces
eleven offenses against the homeless that constitute "quality of life"
crimes. These include camping on public property and sleeping on the
city streets.278
A second reason Seattle's approach is different is that Seattle has
not conducted mass "sweeps" of the homeless as have the other cit-
ies.279 For example, the Pottinger court noted that Miami had a history
of conducting "systematic police 'sweeps' of homeless areas prior to
high-profile events. '2 0  In Tobe, Santa Ana had a history of brutal
sweeps.
The homeless were handcuffed, transported to an athletic field for book-
ing, chained to benches, marked with numbers, and held for as long as
six hours before being released at another location, some for crimes such
as dropping a match, a leaf, or a piece of paper or jaywalking.28 1
Moreover, San Francisco boasts that the purpose of "Matrix" is to
focus police attention on the homeless.2" 2 According to a San Francisco
Chronicle study, between August 1, 1993 and February, 1994, the
police had written "at least 6,240 citations for "quality of life"
offenses.2 83
A final difference is that Seattle has not indicated it desires to
expel the homeless from the community. In contrast, the Pottinger
275. Id. at 1565.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
277. Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389 n.3.
278. John King, Matrix Program Lacking Teeth, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 23, 1994, at A13.
279. Cf. NOWHERE, supra note 12, at 111. The director of a Seattle social service agency is
quoted as saying that Seattle police conduct "routine sweeps of the park" after closing hours and
"rarely arrest homeless people [but rather] use the regulations as a means of harassing them and
forcing them to move along." Id.
280. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1555.
281. Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389.
282. King, supra note 278.
283. Id.
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court noted numerous internal police memoranda discussing a "City
policy of driving homeless from public areas . . . and elimination of
food distribution as strategy to disperse homeless. ' 284 There were sim-
ilar internal communications noted in Tobe, where city officials
intended to " 'force out the vagrant population.' ",285 Thus, unlike San
Francisco, Santa Ana and Miami, Seattle does not appear to be inter-
ested in using the ordinance as a sword to drive homeless people out of
the city.
2. Aspirational Ordinances
Seattle officials contend that the sidewalk and aggressive ordi-
nances are intended to restore a measure of civility to the city streets.28 6
Moreover, according to the Seattle City Attorney, the laws are aspira-
tional in that they announce a broadly held standard of personal
conduct.
Maintaining the civility of our streets and the quality of urban life is
vitally important for all of us. By setting standards and limits on behav-
ior we help the addicted and mentally ill confront the reality of their
afflictions and the need to come to grips with it, rather then enabling
self-destructive behavior through denial and blame shifting.287
The notion that a sidewalk ordinance can be prescriptive has sup-
port within the academic and social service community. Codification
of normative values serves to guide and strengthen the community
where the urban environment is characterized by a more socially dis-
connected citizenry. Professor Amitai Etzioni, in his book The Spirit of
Community,2 s8 points out that in the last century, the kind of innocent
conduct proscribed in Seattle's sidewalk ordinance would usually not
have required police enforcement. According to Etzioni, as long as
family members stayed within the community or another community
with similar values, the community's "moral voice" was generally suffi-
cient to control individualistic, disorderly behavior. 1 9 If the commu-
nity's expectation was oppressive, it still served to temper behavior that
was destructive of society. But, when young people left the community
284. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1561.
285. Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388.
286. Mike Meritt, Anti-Loitering Ordinances Upheld, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar.
11, 1994 at C1.
287. Letter from Mark H. Sidran, Seattle City Attorney, to Josh Cohen, Editor in Chief,
THE BOSTON REviEw (Dec. 23, 1993) (letter on file with Seattle University Law Review); see
generally Rosa Eckstein, Comment, Toward a Communitarian Theory of Responsibility: Bearing the
Burden for the Unintended, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 907-10 (1991).
288. AMrrAi ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMn'uwr (1993).
289. Id. at 18.
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to work in factory towns and live in factory barracks, their community
context changed and the moral voice was lost, perhaps gladly. 290 The
result, however, was rowdyism, alcoholism, prostitution and criminal
conduct. It required law enforcement to temper the destructive behav-
ior.291 Thus, according to Etzioni and his "communitarian" philoso-
phy, to object to the codification and enforcement of commonly held
notions of civility is to object to the "social glue that helps hold the
moral order together.P292
Professor Mary Ann Glendon points out that in the absence of
family, church, and community connections, many Americans regard
legal norms as expressions of minimal common values.2 93 Laws
reflecting these common values of civil conduct-what Mary Ann
Glendon calls aspirational laws-are required to control rowdy behav-
ior.294 She says laws have become aspirational and educational,"expressing something about what kind of people we are and what kind
of society we are in the process of creating." '295 Professor Lawrence M.
Mead puts it more directly than Glendon: "Personal responsibility
must be willed, precisely because it can no longer be assumed. '296
While it is probably safe to assume that a proscription on intimi-
dating solicitation is a common value of personal conduct, it is not so
clear that there is a consensus against sidewalk sitting, even on busy
commercial streets. This raises the question, who is to decide what
conduct is normative?
Professor John Hart Ely disparages the notion that a legislature or
the courts can discover consensus values. He sees this assertion of
group norms as merely the domination of some groups over others by
the enactment of laws deriving from fuzzy ideals and from vague refer-
ences to an ill-defined moral truth.297 But, on grounds that it is easier
for antimajoritarian influences to block legislation than to enact it, Ely
allows that "as between courts and legislatures, it is clear that the latter
are better situated to reflect consensus. '298
This notion of deference to the legislature was reflected in Judge
Rothstein's opinion in Roulette. As to whether the sidewalk ordinance
290. Id.
291. Id. at 118; see also CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VIcTIMS 46 (1992) (supporting
the point that changes in lifestyle require codification of certain normative values).
292, ETZIONI, supra note 288, at 36.
293. GLENDON, supra note 271, at 102.
294. Id. at 104-05.
295. Id.
296, LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 260 (1992).
297. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 64-65 (1980); see also GLENDON, supra
note 271, at 137 (Glendon posits that asserting group rights can result in tribalism.).
298. ELY, supra note 297, at 67.
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would further the city's interest in safety and economic health, Judge
Rothstein held:
The City of Seattle has made a legislative determination that this ordi-
nance will help it to accomplish its goals. In the absence of any showing
that the method it has selected intrudes on constitutionally protected
activities, the sidewalk ordinance is a legitimate legislative
determination.299
If the community benefits from the homeless ordinance, can it be
said the homeless benefit from the ordinances? This issue is taken up
in Section 3.
3. The Ordinance Benefits the Homeless
For two reasons, Seattle's sidewalk ordinance may benefit the
homeless themselves. First, the ordinance thwarts a cycle of victimiza-
tion300 by treating the homeless like every other citizen. Second, the
ordinance provides government with the legal power to control disor-
derly behavior, thus tempering the impulse to merely harass the home-
less out of town.
A social worker who has worked with the homeless for a decade
argues that demanding less of the homeless due to their health or eco-
nomic circumstance ultimately works a disservice.
All people need structure and accountability in their lives. None of us
can maintain our integrity and morality without pressure from our com-
munity. To exempt homeless people from healthy standards of living and
socially useful modes of operating is to expect less from them as human
beings than we expect of ourselves. That is ultimately disempowering,
dishonest, and socially destructive.30 1
This notion that disadvantaged persons require special dispensa-
tion from widely held standards of personal conduct is what Professor
Charles J. Sykes deems the "ethos of victimization."
The ethos of victimization has an endless capacity not only for exculpat-
ing one's self from blame, washing away responsibility in a torrent of
explanation-racism, sexism, rotten parents, addiction, and illness-
but also for projecting guilt onto others.
30 2
299. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1448.
300. Victimization is a "generalized cultural impulse to deny personal responsibility and to
obsess on the grievances of the insatiable self." SYKES, supra note 291, at 22.
301. Vivian Rothstein, Is There a Right to Be Homeless?, BOSTON REVIEW, Dec./Jan. 1993-
94, at 21.
302. SYKEs, supra note 291, at 11.
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Sykes suggests that victimization results in "social gridlock" where
nothing socially useful gets accomplished. Social gridlock, Sykes con-
tends results from an "irresistible search for someone or something
to blame colliding with the unmoveable unwillingness to accept
responsibility."3" 3
In addition, Professor Mead says victimization fails to promote
social harmony and discourages progressive change; a perceived unwill-
ingness to engage in work or treatment sparks the public impression
that the homelessness problem is unsolveable.3 °4 Thus, when homeless
advocates make demands that pay no heed to the needs of the commu-
nity, they set the stage for a harsh, authoritarian backlash that ignores
the underlying causes of homelessness.3 °5
Professor Etzioni points out another reason for holding the home-
less-or anyone who sits on busy urban sidewalks-to normative stan-
dards of conduct: An unreasonable assertion of individual rights
merely serves to devalue their "moral claims. ' 30 6 Professor Glendon
adds that an unreasonable assertion of rights undercuts the very per-
sonal liberty asserted, by corroding the "fabric of beliefs, attitudes, and
habits upon which life, liberty, property, and all other individual and
social goods ultimately depend. "307
At a political level, this unreasonable assertion of rights equates to
what Professor Mead calls the "politics of dependency."30 By claim-
ing the status of victim, Mead says the victim is led to greater depen-
dency: "To exempt people from minimal standards of civility on
grounds that they cannot cope would tempt the poor, and others with
them, toward a collective slough of despondency. That way, most
Americans feel, lies the abyss. 30 9
To apply this reasoning to Seattle's sidewalk ordinance, one could
argue that the ordinance has the virtue of tempering the public desire to
use other laws against the homeless to enforce norms of civility, the
enforcement of which might result in mere harassment. For example,
in Santa Ana, California, frustrated officials used littering ordinances to
arrest homeless people for using the parks.310
Lee C. Bollinger points out that there is danger in unreasonable
toleration by society for conduct it considers normatively inappropri-
303. id. at 15.
304. Id.
305. See ETzIoNI, supra note 288, at 164.
306. Id. at 5.
307. GLENDON, supra note 271, at 15.
308. MEAD, supra note 296, at 158.
309. Id. at 260.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
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ate.311 For example, Bollinger argues that unreasoned veneration of the
First Amendment, when it results in toleration of annoying speech-
related behavior, often leads to less restraint in areas where constitu-
tional doctrine is less protective. 12
To apply Bollinger's theory, if Seattle is forced to tolerate homeless
people lying on commercial sidewalks because such behavior is consti-
tutionally protected, then the city will tend to more vigorously enforce
valid laws against obstruction, public drinking, and urinating in public.
Such a result hinders consensus and promotes an authoritarian backlash
against the homeless.
In summary, the Roulette holding was correct on policy grounds,
although one might quibble with courts' adoption of the obstruction
rationale. Where the city has available another, intent-based, pedes-
trian interference ordinance,3" 3 it is difficult to justify on obstruction
grounds a broad-based ban on sidewalk lounging that potentially
encompasses non-obstructive, innocent behavior. On the other hand,
the urban blight rationale has more merit where the proscribed con-
duct-sitting on certain commercial sidewalks during daylight hours-
has a secondary consequence of deterring other people from using the
public walkways..
It has been argued here that the sidewalk ordinance should with-
stand heightened scrutiny-not reached in Roulette-because prevent-
ing urban blight is a substantial governmental interest. Furthermore,
Seattle should feel no guilt in enacting this ordinance knowing that it is
likely to fall most heavily on people who make their home in the public
forum. To the contrary, this ordinance serves to demonstrate the com-
munity's commitment to maintaining shared values of personal
conduct.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then it is likely that the Roulette
holding will have a number of implications in this area of the law.
Those implications are considered in the next part of this Note.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In its broadest sense, the Roulette holding stands for the proposi-
tion that municipalities may regulate the use of their public spaces
against the homeless on the mere assertion of a legitimate governmental
purpose. The Roulette holding strengthens the doctrinal notion that
government has at least a substantial interest in maintaining the safety
and aesthetics of streets and parks. Furthermore, it appears from the
311. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 228-29 (1986).
312. Id.
313. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE 12A 12.015 (1993).
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holding that courts will not look very deeply at whether a regulation on
sidewalk use actually advances the municipalities asserted interests in
safety and aesthetics.
The Roulette holding only dealt with a facial challenge to the side-
walk ordinance. The holding left open the possibility that the ordi-
nance as applied to the homeless may raise constitutional issues,
particularly if the city attempts to use the law to expel homeless people
from the community."'
However, it appears that Seattle intends to live with its homeless
population, using the ordinance to correct inappropriate behavior in
public places. This intention is evidenced by the fact that the city has
not attempted to close its streets to sleeping at night nor has it
attempted to ban peaceful begging.
Three specific implications can be gleaned from the Roulette
decision:
1. Roulette does not disturb the general rule that sleeping in public
has no constitutional protection. Thus, the municipality need only
assert a legitimate, as opposed to substantial or compelling, govern-
mental interest to infringe the physical conduct of homeless citizens.
2. Preventing sidewalk obstructions and urban blight are sufficiently
legitimate governmental interests to sustain a regulation limiting how
people may use the sidewalk. However, the Roulette decision appears
to caution municipalities against adopting regulations that are so
restrictive that homeless people would be left without a lawful place to
sleep in public. Furthermore, the decision holds open the possibility
that facially valid sidewalk ordinances could infringe upon the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of homeless individuals, as the ordi-
nance is applied to them in its enforcement. For example, the Four-
teenth Amendment right to travel could be implicated if homeless
people were entirely excluded from public places through official har-
assment or stringent enforcement of various nuisance ordinances.
3. Finally, although begging and other political and expressive activi-
ties may be more comfortably performed in a sitting position, a pro-
scription on sidewalk sitting is not so "inextricably linked"315 to First
Amendment conduct as to trigger heightened scrutiny. It appears that
as long as the First Amendment activity may be continued in some
alternative fashion, such as by standing up on the sidewalk, the regula-
tion will be seen as proscribing pure, non-expressive physical conduct.
314. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1446.
315. Id. at 1449.
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VI. CONCLUSION
By upholding a law that proscribes citizens from sitting on busy
sidewalks, the Roulette holding affirmatively elevates personal responsi-
bility over individual rights, even where the ordinance directly impacts
an impoverished class that lives on the streets. But, the holding also
recognizes that the ordinances as applied could be found unconstitu-
tional if the city unreasonably discriminates against the homeless in its
enforcement practices.
The Roulette court's expectation of personal responsibility com-
bined with political tolerance and respect for individual dignity is what
Professor Lawrence M. Mead calls "a new social citizenship."3 '6 Pro-
fessor Amitai Etzioni, guru of the communitarian movement, calls it
being a good steward of the community.317 The central feature of
social citizenship is an elevation of responsibility over rights. The cen-
tral message is that society will help treat the underlying causes of
homelessness, but the homeless are, in the final analysis, responsible
for their own destinies.318 Moreover, the general public and the home-
less are entitled to be free from fear and to enjoy an expectation that all
members of society will abide by common notions of acceptable
conduct.
In light of the Roulette holding, Seattle officials and their constitu-
ents should recognize that economic justice and attention to civil liber-
ties are mutually reinforcing goals.319 If the general public benefits
from the enactment of an ordinance which impinges, if not unconstitu-
tionally, the freedom of the homeless, then there is a corresponding
obligation to extend to the homeless access to a new measure of per-
sonal liberty and dignity. For many homeless people, access to treat-
ment or work would extend their civil liberties and promote the very
civility that is said by Seattle officials to underpin the sidewalk
ordinance.
Put another way, a new social citizenship recognizes an affirmative
commitment by government to promote two freedoms not recognized
under the constitution: the freedom from fear and the freedom from
316. MEAD, supra note 296, at 253.
317. ETzIONI, supra note 288, at 28.
318. See Henry G. Cisneros, If We Are to Truly Help These People, We Must Address the
Problems That Have Rendered Them Homeless in the First Place, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 7,
1993, at B5; Celia W. Dugger, Plan Ties Shelter for the Homeless to Social Services, NEw YORK
TIMEs, May 7, 1994, at Al.
319. See Law, supra note 28, at 148.
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want. 320 The Seattle ordinances address the former; the homeless await
the latter.
320. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 104 (1990). See also BURT, supra note 46, at
226. Burt suggests that the best way to help the homeless is to better treat those with severe
mental illness and to reshape the work environment by improving education and training. Id.
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